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Summary
In the past couple of decades, digitization has affected the strategy of economic players
and the structure of markets across the board by lowering the cost of storing, sharing and
analyzing data. This has given rise to a new field of economics, the economics of digitiza-
tion, which touches upon the fields of industrial organization, market design, information
economics, and labor economics. For industrial economists, these new questions and
challenges coupled with new types of data, have led to vigorous research on the topics
of reputation, search, rankings, matching, and online auctions. Following this line of re-
search, the first two of the chapters in my thesis are on the topics information frictions
and reputation systems in online service markets, and the third chapter proposes a novel
methodology for modeling transaction prices motivated by competition on online distri-
bution channels.
Information Frictions on an Online Services Market
Information frictions can significantly affect the level of economic activity and efficiency,
and this is especially true in services markets because of the number of dimensions along
which the economic agents have to transmit information. Consider the home repairs mar-
ket, where traditionally there is no central marketplace where homeowners and repairmen
meet. A homeowner would have to spend time and effort to lookup in the yellow pages,
ask around for recommendations, or search in other ways for repairmen. Next, he would
have to evaluate their quality, either through their reputation or self-reported experience.
Another complication arises because the repairmen have limited capacity, and whether
they are available is privately observed. If available, their willingness to take on a project
depends on its characteristics relative to other potential projects. Most of the time, home-
owners do not have the time and resources to search, and they accept the terms of the
repairmen. The substantial information frictions cause service markets to be character-
ized by lowered transaction levels, costly search and inefficient matches. Because of this
and the little data availability, economists had little opportunity to study these markets in
the past.
Service markets have greatly benefited from digitization enabling the low cost transmis-
sion of information in online marketplaces. Platforms such as Uber and AirBnB, valued
at billions, would not exist in the ’brick and mortar’ economy. Economists became con-
cerned with understanding how economic agents interact in these markets, and how the
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different sources of information frictions affect market outcomes. Cullen and Farronato
(2015), Fradkin (2017) and Horton (2017) are notable contributions to this small and am-
bitious literature. Their work considers how service buyers search for service sellers and
how a match is eventually formed either at the aggregate level and without agent hetero-
geneity, or using reduced form approaches.
In this paper, I construct and estimate a structural model at the level of the individual
service buyer-seller interaction, which involves two stages: search and matching. The
differentiation on both the supply and demand side, and the one-to-one assignment of
service buyer to service seller make service markets akin to matching markets. I use
the estimated model primitives to study the effect of information transmission features
in reducing frictions by constructing counterfactual platform designs. Comparing their
outcomes, I quantify the effects on the probability and intensity of search, as well as the
probability and efficiency of a match. My model is the first to specifically consider how
seller fixed capacity affects the economic outcomes, both through seller availability and
seller willingness to transact.
To estimate the model, I use data from a home services platform, MaistorPlus. The data
contains information on the characteristics of buyers and sellers, the process of search,
and whether there is a match. As prices are formed outside the platform, after a process
of comparing offers and negotiation, the data does not contain offer or transaction prices.
While price data can be incorporated, my model can be used in settings where the re-
searcher does not observe prices, either because he does not have access to company data
or because this data is private information of the economic agents as in my case. The
model can also be used when the researcher has access to price data but is not allowed to
use it for economic research, as in Fradkin (2017) and Horton (2017).
After estimating the model fundamentals, I construct two information-poor scenarios. I
take two steps back and consider the marketplace with no reliable information on seller
characteristics, eliminating the platform-verified seller profile and reputation, and no in-
formation on whether the seller is currently available. This scenario is akin to choosing
a service provider from the yellow pages. The resulting level of economic activity is ex-
tremely low, indicating information on who the available sellers are is absolutely crucial.
In the second information-poor scenario, the buyer knows which sellers are available but
cannot differentiate between them. Compared to the baseline of MaistorPlus, the search
probability for buyers is two-thirds lower but the search intensity is two times higher. In-
formation on seller characteristics, at the same time, does not affect outcomes conditional
on search taking place: the probability of a match and match efficiency are comparable.
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Finally, I consider a full information scenario, where the last remaining friction - the seller
reservation price for matching with the given buyer - is eliminated. This scenario repre-
sents a limit on the short-run economic activity due to sellers relying on demand from
outside the platform. The probability of a match is double and the matches are 22 percent
more efficient than the baseline.
Reputational Incentives under Heterogenous Demand Fluctuations
Joint work with Jakob Henig, PhD, TSE
As economic activity moves online, the majority of transactions are anonymous and one-
time only. Under these conditions, sellers have an incentive to cheat when the quality of
the good or the level of effort is private information. This is why the success of online
platforms such as eBay and Amazon, but also Uber and AirBnB more recently, can be
credited to a large extent to their successful employment of reputation systems. As in
the ’brick and mortar’ economy, online reputation systems, or mechanisms, create de-
pendence between current and future demand, this way disciplining sellers. What is new
in the digital environment is the platform’s ability to design and optimize such systems,
in particular with respect to how reviews are aggregated and displayed. Athey and Luca
(2018) note that platforms have to consider more carefully the way in which review infor-
mation is made available to buyers, and how this affects seller incentives.
The objective of this paper is to document how a simple reputation system, not adapted
to the economic environment, can fail to provide incentives that are consistent across
sellers and uniform across time. Similarly to other online platforms such as GoogleMaps
and Yelp, the reputation system of MaistorPlus does not discriminate between reviews
when aggregating and displaying them, which may not be optimal. In the home services
sector, there are significant demand fluctuations due to seasonality of certain types of
demand, to which the sellers are heterogeneously exposed. The returns to reputation
also fluctuate with the upcoming demand, making current effort more or less valuable
for sellers depending on their idiosyncratic demand conditions. We test this hypothesis
using a difference in differences econometric model. The results, supported by robustness
checks, document a lower level of effort, measured by the probability of a positive review,
at the end of the high demand season for sellers experiencing high demand fluctuations.
The same sellers would exert higher effort before the start of the high demand season. This
result can inform a better design of the MaistorPlus reputation system, as the platform has
access to the seasonality information. More generally, this result brings attention to the
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issue of optimal review aggregation and display.
Airline Cooperation Effects on Airfare Distribution: An Auction Approach
Joint work with Prof. Marc Ivaldi, TSE and Prof. Miguel Urdanoz, TBS
The third paper in my dissertation proposes a new method to analyze transaction prices
and is motivated by many markets moving product distribution to online sales channels.
Competition online can be considered as more price-focused because transport or search
costs are much lower, and buyers can easily ’comparison shop’ using dedicated web-
sites. The airline industry has been among those most affected, with virtually all trans-
actions moving online, and the widespread use of meta-search engines such as Kayak
(founded 2004) and Priceline (founded 1997). In any given moment, sellers are com-
peting in prices in an open environment which is equivalent to a reverse English auction
(Klemperer (2004)). According to Klemperer, internet markets may be thought of as auc-
tion markets under certain conditions, and their analysis and estimation can be aided by
auction theory and econometrics.
Under this premise, we propose an econometric model based on the equivalence between
competition online and auctions, and estimate it using data from the airline industry. We
use transaction prices from the DB1B survey, an industry standard used in most research
studying airlines. Our application considers how airline alliances affect the transaction
price distribution and we contribute to the literatures on airline alliances and on price
dispersion. We are the first to jointly model price levels and price dispersion in alliance
markets, while the relevant literature typically focuses on price levels only. This allows
us to comment on how alliances affect price variability and to consider a link to price
discrimination. We are also the first to study cooperation, in the form of alliances, within
the literature on price dispersion that typically focuses on the effect of competition. Our
results indicate that alliances are better at price discriminating, as dispersion is higher in
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Chapter 1
Information Frictions on an Online
Services Market
Abstract
Service markets are typically characterized by significant information frictions
because there are many small and heterogeneous buyers and sellers, but also be-
cause seller capacity limited and private information. Surprisingly, these frictions
can persist online and can have substantial effect on market outcomes. This pa-
per contributes to the young and growing empirical literature studying information
frictions in online service environments by proposing for the first time a structural
framework that makes explicit the process by which individual buyers and sellers
search and match, as well as the different sources of information frictions. Simulat-
ing coutherfactual scenarios, I evaluate the effect of these frictions on buyer search
probability and intensity, and on match probability and surplus.
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1.1 Introduction
While e-commerce is synonymous with the incredibly successful goods marketplaces
Amazon and eBay, in recent years service platforms have also gained prominence. The
two most well-known such platforms are AirBnB and Uber, pioneers of the asset shar-
ing economy. In other service sectors, there are Upwork (for IT and business services,
formally Elance and oDesk), Thumbtack (for diverse local services, for example music
lessons or party DJ-ing), and TaskRabbit (for low skill domestic services).
Compared to goods markets, service markets are more susceptible to inefficiency stem-
ming from information frictions. One reason is because there are many small and het-
erogeneous sellers and buyers.1 Consider the home repairs market, with no ”brick and
mortar” marketplace where buyers and sellers meet to announce their demands and of-
fers. When a homeowner requires a service, he starts looking for the service providers:
he can contact a past provider, asks friends, or look at the yellow pages. The homeowner
then may compare the sellers based on information about their experience and expertise.
On their end, the service providers are typically small and may not be available. Their
willingness to take on a job depends on its characteristics, and how it compares on the
potential jobs they would be missing out on.
In many service markets, transmitting and accessing information about characteristics,
availability and preferences is not straightforward. Indeed, the information frictions may
be so significant that some service markets, such as home (AirBnB) and car sharing (Uber)
services, did not exist before the ”moving” online. Online service markets are a meeting
place, they maintain public seller (and buyer) profiles and reputation systems, and trans-
mit information on availability whenever possible. Nevertheless, substantial information
frictions remain even online, especially with relation to the private seller information on
availability and willingness to transact. Horton (2018) documents that on oDesk, buyers’
search and contacting efforts to lead to a rejection in 45 percent of the times, due to sellers
are not available (48 percent) or not willing (29 percent). On AirBnB, seller availability
is public information by means of a calendar, yet buyer requests are still rejected in 42
percent of the time, and mainly because the sellers are not willing to provide the service
(Fradkin (2017)). Both Fradkin (2017) and Horton (2017) show that information frictions
impact the number of matches formed on the platform negatively: buyers are more likely
to stop searching and exit the platform after a rejection.
1 Through out the paper, I refer to the homeowners or platform clients as the buyers, and to the service
provider or professionals as sellers.
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With this paper, I propose for the first time a structural model of the buyer-seller inter-
action, which makes explicit the different sources of information frictions and allows for
straightforward evaluation of their economic impact through construction of counterfac-
tual scenarios. The model uses data from the marketplace MaistorPlus, an online home
services market from Bulgaria, and can potentially be adapted to similar environments.
MaistorPlus functions in the following way: the buyers post a job which is sent to all
subscribing sellers; in turn, the available sellers make themselves known to the buyer by
sending him a massage. The buyer inspects available seller profiles and contacts a number
of them, they discuss offers, after which a buyer-seller pair may reach an agreement. Be-
cause the seller capacity is small and limited, their willingness to transact depends on the
value of other potential jobs they could be doing, or their reservation price. On Maistor-
Plus, the reservation price is based on jobs from traditional channels of demand, such as
client referrals. However, the reservation price as a measure of seller willingness is com-
mon for many other service markets with capacity constrained sellers. In the context of
oDesk, Horton (2016) shows that sellers’ activity on the platform is irregular, suggesting
outside employment plays an important part. For AirBnB, the seller willingness to rent is
based on the possibility to lend the property for a longer stay, or at a better price later on.
I formalize the above described interaction in a two stage search and matching model. The
First stage is the buyer search: he observes the available sellers and their characteristics.
The buyer decides which sellers to search in a directed, simultaneous (fixed sample) man-
ner, paying a constant search cost for each searched seller. Seller reservation prices are
private information as they are based on his private seller-specific demand from outside
the platform. In the Second stage of the model, the searched sellers and the buyer ex-
change offers and possibly there is a stable match. The equilibrium concept for matching
games is stability (Roth and Sotomayor (1992)), and the conditions it implies allow me
to construct and estimate the Second stage parametrically. To identify and estimate the
primitives of the First stage - the bounds on the seller search cost - I assume seller-optimal
surplus allocation of the match.
The structural approach bypasses the need for transaction price or bid (offer) data, which
may not always be available to researchers. It is useful to construct counterfactual settings
that quantify the effect of information frictions. I step back and evaluate the contribution
of the marketplace in resolving two considerable information frictions: eliciting seller
availability and maintaining seller profiles and a reputation system. As a full information
benchmark, I simulate a scenario where the buyers observe the seller reservation price,
which is the last informational asymmetry remaining in the current set-up of MaistorPlus.
The economic outcomes I compare are the search probability and intensity (number of
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sellers searched) and the match probability and surplus.2
My paper is positioned in the small but ambitious literature studying information fric-
tions in online service markets. Cullen and Farronato (2015), Fradkin (2017) and Horton
(2017) use proprietary data from TaskRabbit, AirBnB and oDesk, respectively, to docu-
ment the existence of said frictions and their significant impact on the functioning of the
marketplace. Horton (2017) studies seller rejection for buyers sending a single (early) in-
vitation, representing about 30 percent of the data as many buyers contact multiple sellers.
He does not explicitly model the process of search or matching, nor the source of infor-
mation frictions. Fradkin (2017) defines rejection due to host preferences as the main
information friction in this set-up. He estimates two reduced form models: a discrete
choice model to predict the searcher’s decision and a model of host screening and rejec-
tion. Cullen and Farronato (2015) construct a macro-style structural model of aggregate
matching with frictions in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework with a focus on
demand and supply elasticity. Both Horton (2017) and Fradkin (2017) quantify welfare
effects related to the information friction in their respective settings. Horton (2017) does
a ”back-of-the-envelope” evaluation of the semi-successful capacity signaling feature in-
troduced by oDesk. Fradkin (2017) evaluates a pre-AirBnB scenario and an improved
AirBnB scenario, where ranking incorporates the likelihood of acceptance.
In the context of this work, my first contribution is to construct structural model at the
individual interaction level, which incorporates buyer and seller heterogeneity and ex-
plicitly models the search and match formation processes. The literature up to now has
either approached this issue by reduced form analysis of the buyer or seller individual
choices (Horton (2017), Fradkin (2017)), or by aggregate matching with no heterogeneity
and no explicit information frictions (Cullen and Farronato (2014)). Apart from the aggre-
gate matching model of Cullen and Farronato (2014), the existing studies do not consider,
let alone model, how the match surplus is split and the transaction price is formed. Nor
do they distinguish between the two sources of information friction related to capacity:
seller availability and reservation price. Lastly, the structural model allows me to con-
struct counterfactuals which quantify the economic impact of the frictions. The results
can inform online service market design, and the model has the potential to be general-
ized and applied to other online service markets with similar features.
2 My counterfactuals allow me to focus on the economic impact of information frictions without burdening
the analysis with two-sided market issues (Rochet and Tirole (2006)). A more active role of the platform
would make strategic the buyer and seller decision to subscribe, the buyer decision to post a job, the
seller decision to indicate availability, and the joint decision to form a match. However, the potential for
the platform to further improve efficiency by taking a more active role warrants future research.
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This paper is also related to the intersecting literatures on search and matching, and in par-
ticular to the structural models which combine them. Chade, Eeckhout and Smith (2017)
review the foundations and recent advances in with a focus on empirics. Key differences
with this literature stem from the nature of the economic environment generating my
data, described in Section 1.3. My paper is also related to the consumer search literature.
Some recent contributions are De los Santos, Hortacsu and Wildenbeest (2012) on testing
search models using online search patterns and Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor and Wilden-
beest (2015) on methods to estimate discrete-choice demand with search on the match
value of utility. The theoretical search model that I develop has the flavor of the stochastic
portfolio problem of Chade and Smith (2010), with key differences made clear in Section
1.3. The consumer search literature does not consider seller capacity constraints, to the
best of my knowledge.
The paper has the following structure. In Section 1.2, I describe and solve for the equi-
librium of the two-stage search and matching game. Section 1.3 demonstrates the iden-
tification of the primitives of interest. Section 1.4 details the steps I take to estimate the
model. Section 1.5 contains the results of the estimation, and Section 1.6 contains the
counterfactual analysis. I conclude in Section 1.7.
1.2 Data
MaistorPlus are based in Bulgaria and started operating in 2012.3 The marketplace con-
nects home owners, referred to as buyers, to home service professionals, referred to as
sellers. Similar business model exists in many other countries: Thumbtack, Angie’s List
in the US; RatedPeople, MyBuilder, and Home Jane in the UK; MyHammer, Blau Arbeit,
and Haus Helden in Germany; and Travaux in France.
The marketplace works in the following way. Buyers post jobs for free, and sellers pay
a monthly subscription fee to have access to them.4 The marketplace is additionally fi-
nanced by advertising. The platform maintains verified seller profiles and a public reputa-
tion system. All sellers are notified when a job is posted, and those available can message
the buyer. The sellers do not commit to a price before being contacted or searched; the
3 The website of MaistorPlus is: http://maistorplus.com/
4 The fee design affects only the extensive margin (how many agents have subscribed, or participation)
and not the intensive margin (the activity of the subscribed agents, or usage). It allows me to consider
the seller and buyer activity (sellers sending messages of availability, buyers searching the sellers) as
decisions not affected by strategic considerations related to the fee structure.
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buyer decides which of the available sellers to search based on their profile and reputa-
tion. Searching entails discussions of the job over the phone and visits. Note that I do not
observe offers, transaction prices, and the process by which the price is set. I only observe
which sellers are available, which sellers are contacted by the buyer, and which seller is
hired.
1.2.1 Jobs, activity, seller profiles
In the complete sample, I have 4,167 jobs posted on the platform between January 2013
and June 2015, or about 231 jobs posted each month. The total suggested budget by the
buyers is 12 million euro, with the median job budget of 250 euro. On average, 80.6 sellers
are notified when a job is posted. The average activity for each job is the following: there
are 5.4 available sellers and the buyer searches 1.4 of them. The buyer does not search
in 38.7 perfent of the time (1,611 jobs). Conditional on searching, the match probability
increases from 0.27 percent to 0.44 percent. This information is available in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Activity at the level of the job
Observations Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Full sample of jobs
Notified sellers 4,167 80.2 46.4 1 397
Available sellers 4,167 5.37 5.5 1 61
Pr(Search) 4,167 0.61 0.5 0 1
Searched sellers 4,167 1.29 1.6 0 10
Pr(Match) 4,167 0.27 0.4 0 1
Jobs with search
Notified sellers 2,556 81.2 46.8 1 397
Available sellers 2,556 5.54 5.5 1 61
Pr(Search) 2,556 1.00 0.0 1 1
Searched sellers 2,556 2.09 1.6 1 10
Pr(Match) 2,556 0.44 0.5 0 1
These descriptive statistics are in line with search and matching on other service provision
platforms: buyers search multiple service sellers and the probability to be rejected is
considerable. For example, the data of Fradkin (2017) for activity on AirBnB shows that
buyers who search view 5.5 percent of all available listings (73 listings), and search 2.4
listings on average. Overall, 42 percent of all searches are rejected. Similalry, buyers on
oDesk invite 2 sellers on average to apply to their job, the invitation acceptance rate is 55
percent, and the probability that the job opening is eventually filled is 55 percent (Horton
6
(2017)). Cullen and Ferronato (2014) report similar results for TaskRabbit: of all posted
tasks, 78 percent receive at least one offer, the average being 2.8 offers per job; 49 percent
of tasks result in a match.
There are a total of 817 active sellers in the sample. The seller profile contains the fol-
lowing information: categories of activity, profile description, references from previous
buyers and pictures from past jobs. These characteristics are fixed over time; summary
statistics are provided in Table 1.2. Characteristics describing the seller experience on the
marketplace and the seller’s message indicating availability are measured at the moment
the job is posted and for those sellers who are available. The experience variables are
the seller tenure on the marketplace (in months), the total times the seller was hired, and
the percent positive reviews he has received.5 The message-related variables are message
length (measured in characters) and the time of the message (measured in hours since the
job was posted on the online marketplace). Summary statistics for these variables are also
presented in Table 1.2 for the total of 22,379 times any seller was available in the sample.
Table 1.2: Seller characteristics at time of availability for any job in the sample.
Observations Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Profile (fixed)
Active categories 817 4.80 4.7 1 21
References 817 0.14 0.6 0 3
Profile description length (chars.) 817 548.77 497.6 0 3,645
Pictures 817 10.76 24.5 0 490
Experience (at availability)
Percent positive reviews 22,379 0.33 0.4 0 1
Marketplace tenure (months) 22,379 7.48 7.1 0 37
Total times hired 22,379 3.78 7.1 0 46
Message (at availability)
Message length 22,379 240.47 290.8 0 11,932
Message time (hours) 22,379 3.58 14.7 0 577
Lastly, the buyer provides a textual description, indicates the job category (one of 21
categories such as carpentry, roof repairs, construction, etc), expected start date (one of 8
categories), and proposed budget (one of 12 categories). The frequencies of the different
characteristics (job category, start and budget) can be found the Appendix.
5 The percent positive reviews is a reputation measure is defined as in Tadelis (2016). I count missing
reviews of completed jobs as non-positive reviews, as it has been demonstrated that buyers prefer not to
leave any feedback when they are not fully satisfied (Tadelis (2016)).
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1.2.2 Reduced form analysis
The reduced form analysis presented in this section provides grounding for the theoreti-
cal model. First, I consider outcome variables at the different stages of the process: how
many sellers were available (regression A), how many sellers were searched by the buyer
(regression S), and the probability of a match (regression M ) at the individual job level.
As explanatory variables, I am interested in the following exogenous covariates: job char-
acteristics (expected budget and start), year fixed effects and demand factors. The High
demand season dummy equal to 1 for the period June-November.6 I also control for the
previous stage’s activity. The first two processes are modeled by a Poisson distribution,
and the second - a probit.7
The results are presented in Table 1.3. Regression A indicates that: MaistorPlus’ ability
to bring sellers on board is important for the buyers, as more notified sellers leads to more
available sellers. The High demand season lowers the number of available sellers, as
can be expected when sellers are capacity constrained. In regression B, which describes
buyer search, the demand conditions do not appear to be significant for the buyer search
process. The last regression, M , demonstrates that the probability of a match depends
on the demand conditions even after controlling for the number of available and searched
sellers. As the hiring decision is jointly made, this result suggests that the value of the
job to the available seller depends on the state of demand. Because capacity is fixed, the
sellers must consider the value of giving up outside options, which are undoubtedly more
when demand is high, before agreeing on a match. Job characteristics such as the job start
and budget also have significant predictive power in all thee regressions.
In Table 1.4, I present evidence that buyer search is directional: the sellers are contacted
based on how they compare to each other. I model the probability that an available seller
is contacted by the buyer using a logit regression. As independent variables, I have seller
and available competitor characteristics.8 In the first model, S1, all seller characteristics
have a significant impact on the probability that a seller is searched, except for market-
place tenure. The estimated coefficients have the expected signs: fuller profiles, more
experience and faster and more detailed messages make sellers more attractive. Includ-
6 Significantly more jobs are posted on the platform during that period, due to construction and other
categories being outside work, as well as homeowners preparing for the fall and winter months. A priori,
there is no reason to believe that demand fluctuations on the marketplace are different from those outside
of the marketplace.
7 The results using the subsample of jobs for which the buyer searches at least one seller are consistent.
8 Although not presented in the table, I control for job characteristics, number of notified, available and
searched sellers, job category fixed effects, the high demand season and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.3: Job-level activity: available sellers, search and
probability of a match
A S M
Model Poisson Poisson Probit
N. notified sellers 0.434*** 0.072* 0.038
(0.026) (0.037) (0.046)
N. available sellers 0.568*** -0.448***
(0.036) (0.053)
N. searched sellers 1.181***
(0.042)
High demand season -0.451*** 0.061 -0.261***
(0.026) (0.046) (0.059)
Job start 0.177*** (0.028) -0.330***
(0.029) (0.043) (0.056)
Job budget 0.113*** 0.090** -0.169***
(0.021) (0.038) (0.051)
Constant 0.765*** -1.955*** -0.151
(0.139) (0.292) (0.327)
Year fixed effects Yes*** Yes** Yes***
Job category fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.09 0.19
Observations 4,167 4,167 4,167
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Continu-
ous variables are transformed by taking the natural logarithm. More
detailed results are available upon request.
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ing the corresponding average competitor characteristics in S2 shows that any seller is
less likely to be searched the more attractive his competitors are. Finally, in S3 I include
seller fixed effects to control for unobserved seller features. The fit of the regression, as
measured by the pseudo-R2, does not appear to improve much, which suggests that the
buyers do not have private information on the sellers that is different from what is already
included in the seller profile, experience and message.9
Lastly, the hiring decision in service markets is joint, which is an important feature that
sets these markets apart from goods markets. It is not always the case that the buyer is able
to match with, or hire, the most ex-ante attractive seller, even if that seller is available.
I denote the predicted probability of search from regression S3 seller attractiveness. I
rank sellers by this probability, with the most attractive seller is ranked as 1, and less
attractive sellers have lower ranks (2, 3 etc). The data shows that on average the buyers
match with sellers of attractiveness 2.3, possibly because the highest ranking seller asked
for too much.
1.3 Model
Consider a simple model of one-to-one matching with transfers (prices), where on one
side there is a single buyer indexed by i and on the other side there are multiple sellers
indexed by j. Let Ni be the number and {Ni} be the set of sellers available for job i.
Similarly, let ni be the number and {ni} be the set of searched sellers such that {ni} ⊂
{Ni} and ni ≤ Ni.
When a seller is not available for a given job, I consider that their capacity is fully uti-
lized and it is physically impossible for them to be hired at the given moment. Whenever
they are available, their willingness to take on the job depends on whether they will be
compensated for their reservation price. As seller capacity is fixed, taking on one project
means giving up on another. The reservation price represents the value of all work oppor-
tunities the seller would give up to take on a given job. For the sellers on MaistorPlus, the
reservation price is based on demand coming through traditional channels such as client
referrals, repeated clients, and yellow pages. This is why there are only 5.4 sellers are
available on average for any job, out of the 80.2 sellers that are notified.
9 Any private information on the sellers is only revealed after the job is completed, hence it does not affect
the decision of the buyer to contact or hire the seller. This information can be then transmitted to future
buyers though the reputation system. Repeated hiring, which may be affected by the buyer’s private
information on seller type, happen outside of the platform.
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Table 1.4: Probability of searching any available seller.
S1 S2 S3
Profile
Seller active categories -0.054** -0.050*
(0.024) (0.029)
Competitor active categories 0.005 -0.027
(0.054) (0.053)
Seller references 0.123*** 0.136***
(0.039) (0.044)
Competitor references -0.045 0.028
(0.076) (0.076)
Seller profile decription length 0.020*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007)
Competitor profile description length -0.038** -0.014
(0.019) (0.019)
Seller pictures 0.031*** 0.035***
(0.010) (0.011)
Competitor pictures -0.018 -0.017
(0.021) (0.021)
Experience
Seller percent positive reviews 0.298*** 0.381*** 0.441***
(0.057) (0.068) (0.088)
Competitor percent positive reviews -0.431*** -0.381***
(0.115) (0.119)
Seller total times hired 0.124*** 0.162*** 0.033
(0.019) (0.022) (0.032)
Competitor total times hired -0.090*** -0.086**
(0.033) (0.034)
Seller marketplace tenure -0.02 -0.023 0.032
(0.018) (0.020) (0.026)
Competitor marketplace tenure -0.016 -0.043
(0.038) (0.039)
Message
Seller message length 0.022** 0.054*** 0.046***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Competitor message length -0.132*** -0.141***
(0.022) (0.023)
Seller message time -0.298*** -0.381*** -0.376***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021)
Competitor message time 0.181*** 0.185***
(0.020) (0.021)
Seller fixed effects Yes***
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.43 0.45
Observations 22,379 22,379 22,379
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Continuous variables are
transformed by taking the natural logarithm. More detailed results are available
upon request.
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Yet, the sellers are not equally in demand: sellers with more experience and better reputa-
tion are more attractive to buyers, as demonstrated in Table 1.4. Demand conditions also
matter: the sellers experience higher demand in the summer and fall, which allows them
to be more picky about jobs. Let r̃ij denote average reservation price: given the observed
seller and job characteristics (including the period at which the job was posted), what is
the expected minimum compensation. As this information is visible to the buyer, so is
r̃ij . On the other hand, the exact incidence, profitability and size of demand faced by any
seller at any point in time is random and privately observed. This random demand fluctu-
ation determines the seller private reservation price rij , not observed by the marketplace
nor the buyer.
Once matched together, the buyer-seller pair generates match output f̃ij . The match out-
put is a function of the job characteristics and seller characteristics. It is therefore also
observed by both the buyer and the sellers. Note that certain seller characteristics may
affect both the match output f̃ij and the average reservation price r̃ij , such as for exam-
ple seller experience. A more experienced seller will both do a better job, and require a
higher compensation. However, with no data on transaction or offer prices, the econo-
metric model does not identify the effect of seller experience on f̃ij and r̃ij separately. I
proceed by grouping them in the observed (by the buyer and econometrician) net match
output: fij = f̃ij − r̃ij . Finally, the surplus generated by the match is the net match output
less the private seller reservation price, sij = fij − rij . As the buyer does not observe rij ,
he does not observe sij but only fij .
I argue that the realizations of the private seller reservation prices rij are independent
across the different sellers available for the same job, and for the same seller across dif-
ferent jobs.
Assumption 1. rij ⊥ rik
Assumption 2. rij ⊥ ri′j
By Assumption 1, the rij are independently distributed across different sellers j and k
within the same job i. The sellers are small relative to each other and relative to the
market, which implies that they face idiosyncratic demand shocks. They are not in direct
competition on or off the platform except for the given job i. This assumption also rules
out a ”common value” aspect to rij , in the language of auction economics.
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10 A common value a set up would entail that sellers do not know the true, common reservation price
and they estimate it based on a private signal. I do not find this to be a realistic representation of the
economic environment: the sellers have access to the same information, hence there is no private signal;
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By Assumption 2, the seller j reservation prices rij and ri′j across jobs i and i
′ are
independent. As the net output fij already contains the average seller reservation price
r̃ij , the remaining private component rij is random at the moment of posting the job i:
the specific realization of idiosyncratic seller outside demand net of the average. The two
assumptions on the nature of rij allow me to treat the realizations of rij across the different
sellers available within a market as independent, and the markets i as independent.
Denote in the upper case R the random reservation price, whose realizations are the rij .
In addition to independence, I assume this variable is identically distributed across sellers
and jobs:
Assumption 3. R is identically distributed across sellers and jobs with cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) GR(.).
The contribution of observed job and seller characteristics to the match output is fij ,
therefore the random reservation price R is mean independent from this. Assumption
3 is stronger, implying all moments of the distribution do not depend on the observed
characteristics, and therefore on fij: GR(.|fij) = GR(.). With no information on the
realizations of R, the match surplus is also random: Sij = fij −R. Its distribution is:
Gij(s) = Pr(Sij ≤ s|fij) = Pr(fij −R ≤ s) =
= Pr(fij − s ≤ R) = 1− Pr(R ≤ fij − s) = 1−GR(fij − s)
The search and matching model is set-up in the following way. In Zero stage, which
is non-strategic, Nature draws the buyer i and the set of available sellers {Ni}. The
buyer and the available sellers observe the job and seller characteristics, therefore the
fij’s for all sellers in {Ni}. The available sellers have private information about their
reservation prices rij . In the First stage, the buyer searches the optimal set of sellers {ni}
in a simultaneous and directed manner, paying a positive search cost ci for each seller.
In the Second stage, the sellers in {ni} compete by making utility offers to the buyer. A
match between a seller and the buyer may be formed if it is stable. Figure 1.1 displays
the sequence. The game is solved by backward induction.
all material costs are borne by the buyer , hence there is no uncertainty about a common cost. Any
unexpected developments during the completion of the job are re-negotiated by the parties. Thus, the
predominant concern with taking on a job comes from their capacity limitations and private idiosyncratic
demand.
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Figure 1.1: Stages of the search and matching game.
1.3.1 Second stage
In the Second stage, the searched sellers {ni} compete to form a match with the buyer.
As the sellers are vertically differentiated, the buyer is willing to pay more for a seller
with more experience or a deeper specialization. I consider the sellers making offers to
the buyer in utility space. For a given match output, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the utility offer and the transaction price, which is not observed in the data. The
equilibrium concept is match stability: the match must satisfy individual rationality for
each party and must assign the buyer to the seller who generates the highest match surplus
(Roth and Sotomayor (1992)).
The surplus created by a stable match may be split between buyer and seller through the
price in infinitely many ways. MaistorPlus, however, does not record prices or provide an
explicit framework for how they are set.11 The surplus split affects the ex-ante expected
utility of the buyer in the First stage of the model, therefore the optimal search set {ni}
and the estimation of the search costs.
I consider the seller-optimal surplus allocation: the winning seller has offered the buyer a
utility that makes the second-highest surplus seller indifferent. The mechanism by which
this can be achieved is the reverse English auction, or open ascending auction in utility
(Roth and Sotomayor (1992)).12 As a mechanisms, the English auction has two important
features. Firstly, it guarantees that the assignment, or the match, is efficient, i.e. the seller
who generates the highest match surplus will be matched with the buyer. This is true with
11 The flexibility of interaction environment is necessary for the home service industry, where sellers are
unwilling to commit to a price before speaking with the buyer, and where both sides of the interaction
typically do not wish to reveal the transaction value to the platform. Other service platforms may employ
a different degree of structure on how the partners negotiate and agree to split the surplus. For example,
on AirBnB, service sellers typically set a daily rate, which is recommended by the platform algorithm.
Interactions on Thumbtack and TaskRabbit (formerly oDesk and Elance) are structured as an open auc-
tion. oDesk was previously structured in a similar way as MaistorPlus, but offers are exchanged via the
messaging service of the platform.
12 In the private values framework, the English auction format is strategically equivalent to the Second
price sealed bid auction format (Krishna (2009)). The English auction appears to be more suitable in the
particular economic environment.
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ex-ante asymmetric sellers, as in our game. Secondly, the English auction equilibrium is
in dominant strategies and I do not have to make assumptions about what the sellers know
or learn about each other.
For the moment, consider a single buyer and drop the subscript i. The buyer utility of
transacting with seller j is uj = fj−p and the seller j utility is vj = p−rj .13 The strategies
of the sellers are defined as utility offers they will make to the buyer as in Laffont-Tirole
(1993). Let the searched sellers {n} be ordered by match surplus: s1 = f1 − r1 ≥ ... ≥
sn = fn − rn. The match stability requires two things. First, the buyer forms a match
with the seller who generates the highest match surplus, s1. Second, that the individual
rationality constraints are satisfied. For the buyer it is IRbj : uj = fj − p ≥ 0 when
transacting with seller j, and for seller j it is IRsj : vj = p−rj ≥ 0. For this to be possible,
it must be that the generated surplus is at least positive, u1 + v1 = f1 − r1 = s1 >= 0.
The English auction works in the following way. The auctioneer (the buyer) starts from
an utility offer of zero and raises it. The sellers remain in the auction while they agree
to the offer, and the game ends when only one seller remains. The transaction utility is
that at which the second-last seller drops out of the game. The players’ weekly dominant
strategies are to remain in the game up to the point they are indifferent (Vickrey (1961)).
In other words, player j generating match surplus sj = fj − rj remains up to the utility
offer uj = sj and drops out afterwards.
The game can be summarized by the following three cases:14
1. 0 < s2 ≤ s1: 1 wins, gives the buyer utility u1 = s2 > 0
• transaction price is determined by f1 − p = f2 − r2 so p = f1 − f2 + r2
• IRs1 : v1 = p− r1 ≥ 0 is satisfied because s1 = f1 − r1 ≥ s2 = f2 − r2
2. s2 ≤ 0 ≤ s1: 1 wins, gives the buyer utility u1 = 0
• transaction price is determined by f1 − p = 0 so p = f1
• IRs1 : v1 = p− r1 ≥ 0 is satisfied because s1 = f1 − r1 ≥ 0
3. s2 ≤ s1 < 0: no transaction15
13 Here the observed seller reservation price r̃j is also zero. This does not change the equilibrium but makes
the exposition clearer.
14 When ni = 1, there is only the last two cases.
15 Search without hiring is very common in the data, which raises the question why sellers with sij ≤ 0
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The transaction takes place only in the first two cases, and in only the first case the buyer
gets positive utility.
1.3.2 First stage
Given the expected utility of the Second stage, in the First stage the buyer decides which
sellers to search at a positive and constant marginal cost c. I model the search process as
directed and simultaneous for the following reasons. On MaistorPlus, the candidates in-
dicate their availability soon after the job is posted and the buyer can direct his search by
their observed characteristics. This is different from labour markets, where Chade, Eeck-
hout and Smith (2017) consider sequential random search because of the much longer
horizon over which candidates arrive, and the fact that the identity of the candidates is
not known ex-ante. My setting favors simultaneous search because the transaction price
is determined in the Second stage of the interaction. Thus, the buyer has an incentive to
bring the sellers together so that they can compete in making offers. Simultaneous search
models are favored in settings of consumer search, as in the online online book industry
studied by De los Santos, Hortacsu, Wildenbeest (2012). The search model I construct is
close to the optimal portfolio model of Chade and Smith (2010). The difference is that
the probability of hiring and expected surplus of any seller added to the search set in my
model is a function of all other sellers already added to the search set through the expected
highest surplus, while in their model the success rate and ex-post payoff of the any of the
sellers are fixed and independent.
The buyer must choose among N differentiated stochastic options, which is a combina-
torial optimization problem. I show that the buyer searches sellers in order of decreasing
observed match surplus fj and up to the point where the marginal benefit of an additional
seller is less than c.16 Let the random variable S2:{L} be the second-highest realization of
indicate availability. It is possible that a common component of f̃j is only revealed in the search stage
by the buyer. For example, details about the project which affect all sellers in the same way could
be omitted from the buyer description. As long as the sellers have no private signal about it (i.e. the
”common values” framework, which I exclude by assuming no correlation of the rij’s across j) this does
not cause selection on the part of the sellers.
16 The cost of the first search is normalized to zero, similarly to Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) and Dubois
and Perrone (2015). When the buyer contacts only one seller, the expected utility of the buyer is zero.
Ex-ante no buyer would be willing to contact only a single seller at a positive search cost, but many
such observations exist in the data. The assumption of zero search cost for the first search makes buyers
indifferent between searching 1 and 0 sellers, which is consistent with the data. One could think of
the decision to search at least one professional as incorporated into the decision to post the job on the
marketplace.
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match surplus from a random set {L} of searched sellers. The cumulative distribution of
this variable, which is an order statistic, is:
GS
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The buyer anticipates the three potential outcomes of the Second stage. Only in the first
case he receives positive expected utility, which is equal to E[U ] = E[S2:{L}|S2:{L} >
0]Pr(S2:{L} > 0). It is derived as:




















Now I compare the distributions of the second highest match surplus from the sets {L}+
{l} and {L}+{l′}, where fl > fl′ . If the difference between GS2:{L}+{l}(s) and GS2:{L}+{l
′}
(s)
is negative, by the property of first order stochastic dominance the random variable dis-
tributed by GS
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Since fl > fl′ , I know GR(fl− s) > GR(fl′ − s) because GR(.) is an increasing function.
This makes the first part of the expression negative. The distribution of the second highest
match surplus from {L} + {l} first order stochastic dominates that from {L} + {l′}.
Adding a seller with higher fj to any set {L} is optimal as it leads to a higher expected
utility for the buyer. By induction, this holds for sets of any size and composition.
The second order condition - that the marginal benefit of each seller added to the search
set decreases - cannot be proven analytically for a general function GR(.). Instead, in the
Appendix I demonstrate that it holds for the specific functional form of GR(.) given in
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Assumption 4 in the next section and for the values of f observed in the data.
1.4 Identification and estimation
In this section, I describe what is observed in the data, the model, and how I am able to
identify the primitives.
1.4.1 Observables, primitives and assumptions
In the data, I observe buyers i ∈ {1, ...,M} posting jobs on the marketplace. For each
observation i and the corresponding available sellers {Ni}, both I (the econometrician)
and the buyer observe the characteristics of the job and seller pair. The job characteristics,
constant across sellers j, are labeled Zi. These are the start date, category, proposed
budget for the job and date fixed effects. The seller characteristics for each job-seller
pair ij are labeled Xij . These are the seller profile, experience and message variables
presented in Table 1.2.
The match surplus is modeled as the sum of the observed net output fij and unobserved
reservation price rij already introduced in Section 1.3: sij = fij − rij . The net output is




ijβ1 and the average seller




ijβ2, where some covariates may enter both. Without
transaction and offer prices, I am not able to identify how the covariates affect these two





ijβ. The match surplus is therefore parametrized in the following way:
sij = fij − rij = Z ′iγ +X ′ijβ − rij
The primitives of interest from the Second stage estimation are the coefficients γ of Zi
and β of Xij . The primitives of interest from the First stage estimation are the search cost
bounds [ci, c]i.
Lastly, consider the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 4. −R ∼ Type 1 Extreme value
The ex-ante random negative reservation price −R follows an Type 1 Extreme Value dis-
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tribution, with probability function g−R(a) = −e−ae−e−a and cumulative density G−R(a) =
−e−e−a .17 As in other discrete choice models, the scale of the coefficients, and therefore
of the surplus, is not identified and must be set by the econometrician. The distributional
assumption here sets the level of the variance of the error term to π2/6, which automati-
cally sets the scale.
1.4.2 Second stage
The sample of M jobs is comprised of independent observations, indexed by i. Each job
can have one of the following outcomes: either no one is hired, or one of the searched
sellers is hired. Let the probability of the first event be Pr(Yi = 0), and the probability
that seller j ∈ {ni} is hired be Pr(Yi = j). Let dij be an indicator equal to 1 when buyer
i hires seller j, and zero otherwise. The indicator for the event that no one is hired is
di0 = 1−
∑j=ni
j=1 dij . The probability for any outcome for job i is:








The derivation of the Maximum Likelihood can be found in the Appendix. The Likeli-
hood function for the whole sample is:





























Although this form of the Likelihood is reminiscent of the standard multinomial choice
model, in fact there is an important difference rooted in the equilibrium of the match-
ing game. In standard multinomial choice, the buyer chooses the best seller among a
number of options. The identification strategy is based on utility differences between the
options, thus it identifies the effects of variables that are different across the options. In
my specification, these are the variables Xij their corresponding coefficients β.
17 Working with the distribution of the negative reservation price results in a cleaner maximum likelihood
derivation, without affecting the rest of the model.
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In the matching game, however, match stability requires that whenever a seller is hired,
the match surplus is positive. This introduces an additional condition on the overall level
of match surplus, which identifies the effects of the variables specific to the buyer, or the
job. In our model, these are variables Zi and their corresponding coefficients γ.
1.4.3 First stage
The sellers are added to the search set {ni} in order of decreasing fij , and {ni − 1} and
{ni + 1} denote the sets with one less and one more seller, respectively. The optimal
search set {ni} of the buyer implies the following equilibrium inequalities on the search
cost ci:
ci = E[S
2:{ni+1}]− E[S2:{ni}] ≤ ci ≤ E[S2:{ni}]− E[S2:{ni−1}] = ci
For each job i, these bounds will be different because a different set of sellers {Ni} is





ijβ̂. The CDF of the match surplus Sij for any job-seller pair ij is:
Ĝij(s) = 1−GR(f̂ij − s)
This allows me to construct ĜS
2:{ni} . I construct the upper and lower bound on the search





18 Some jobs are special cases, for example jobs where the set of available sellers {Ni} is equal to the set
of searched sellers {ni}. They are discussed in more detail in the Appendix.
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1.5 Results
This section contains the results of the estimation: the coefficients β̂, on variables Xij ,
and γ̂, on variables Zi, and the individual search cost bounds [ĉi, ĉi].
1.5.1 Second stage
Table 1.5 presents the results from the MLE estimation of the Second stage. The variables
Xij are split into the seller fixed characteristics Xj that describe the seller’s profile, and
the seller characteristics measured at the time the job was posted Xij that describe the
seller experience and the message he sends to the buyer. I present four models (M1) to
(M4), each with a different subset of covariates. Likelihood ratio tests indicate that model
(M4), with the full set of variables, fits the data significantly better than the models with
less explanatory variables. Robustness checks with seller fixed effects are presented in
the Appendix
The estimated coefficients represent the net effect of the given variable on the net output
f , this way combining the effect on the output f̃ and the effect on the average seller
reservation price r̃. This makes their interpretation less straightforward. For example, the
results indicate a significant negative effect of the number of job categories in which the
seller is active. This could be because the seller is less specialized, therefore his expertise
does not contribute to the match output f̃ as much. Alternatively, it could be that a seller
working in many categories has higher demand on average, and therefore higher r̃. For
other variables, net coefficients that are not significant may be due to the two effects
having opposing directions.
I find that the majority of seller fixed profile characteristics, such as the number of pic-
tures, references, and the length of the description, are mostly not significant, while the
experience-related variables all have significant effects. The first result could arise from
seller characteristics having equal but oposite effects on the output and average seller
reservation price. The second result suggests that the marketplace reputation system is
a meaningful source of information and incentives. It is also interesting to note that the
variables describing the seller message to the client, the message length and time, do not
appear to have a very strong significance in the last regression. One reason could be that
they are ”cheap talk”, and therefore not taken as a meaningful signal by the buyer. Indeed,
inspection of the messages proves that the majority are formulaic and repeat information
from the seller’s profile.
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Table 1.5: Results from the MLE estimations.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Xj
Seller pictures -0.039 -0.047* 0.011 0.003
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Seller references -0.286** -0.109 -0.199 -0.116
(0.101) (0.104) (0.105) (0.109)
Seller profile description length 0.011 0.007 0.021 0.011
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Seller active categories -0.081 -0.469*** -0.069 -0.264***
(0.047) (0.056) (0.052) (0.064)
Xij
Seller percent positive reviews 0.879*** 0.546***
(0.140) (0.144)
Seller marketplace tenure -0.223*** -0.163***
(0.046) (0.049)
Seller total times hired 0.373*** 0.188***
(0.044) (0.049)
Seller message length -0.037 0.056*
(0.024) (0.025)
Seller message time -0.176*** 0.048
(0.050) (0.124)
Zi
Job budget -0.272*** -0.257***
(0.068) (0.068)
Job start -0.350*** -0.342***
(0.075) (0.076)
High demand season -0.383*** -0.397***
(0.078) (0.079)
Year fixed effects Yes*** Yes***
Job category fixed effects Yes*** Yes***
Constant -1.031*** -0.155 0.305 0.718
(0.149) (0.194) (0.501) (0.528)
Likelihood -2,592 -2,461 -2,200 -2,170
Observations 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Continuous variables are
transformed by taking the natural logarithm. More detailed results are available upon
request.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the mid-point of the estimated search costs, average upper and
lower bounds on the mid-point.
Lastly, a larger budget, a more delayed start and the job being posted in the high demand
season decrease the match surplus. It is not surprising to see that periods of higher demand
contribute to a lower surplus, because seller average reservation prices must also be higher
due to the numerous job opportunities. It likely that bigger projects lead to delays and
complications, and that projects further away in time are less certain, thus associated with
a higher average reservation prices.
1.5.2 First stage
For each buyer, I estimate the individual search cost bounds [ci, ci] using the Second stage
results and the buyer’s optimal search decision. Figure 1.2 presents a kernel density esti-
mate of the probability distribution of the estimated mid-point, cmi = (ĉi + ĉi)/2. It also
displays the average ĉi and ĉi for observations of the search cost falling in each of the bins
over which the density is estimated. The distribution has two peaks, and there is a positive
mass of sellers with zero search costs.
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1.6 Counterfactuals
MaistorPlus provides the buyers with the following benefits. Firstly, the platform has
the contact information of multiple subscribing sellers. Secondly, it notifies these sellers
simultaneously about the buyer’s job and those who are available indicate that to the buyer,
thus saving the buyer from searching unavailable sellers. Lastly, the website contains
verified seller profile information and a reputation system.
I construct counterfactual scenarios to evaluate how the last two features affect the eco-
nomic outcomes on the platform. The Random scenario is very information poor, and
akin to the buyer picking out sellers at random from the phone book: there is no in-
formation on seller availability, no verified information on their expertise and previous
buyer experiences. In the Random available scenario, the buyer now knows which sellers
are available, but again any information they provide about their expertise and previous
buyer experiences is cheap talk. I denote as the Directed available the current set-up of
MaistorPlus.
Despite the marketplace alleviating most information frictions, the buyers are not able to
observe costlessly the private reservation prices of the sellers. As a benchmark with no
information asymmetry, I consider the Frictionless scenario. This can be achieved either
by the platform finding a way to lower buyer search costs to zero, or the platform finding
a way to make sellers truthfully reveal their reservation prices.
1.6.1 Method
In my counterfactuals I sample repeatedly the observations-markets as presented in Zero
stage of the model: the jobs posted on the platform with the associated available sellers.
This means sampling jointly the following: the job characteristics Zi, the set of notified
{Ñi} and available {Ni} sellers, their respective characteristics Xi = Xi1, ..., Xini . For
the optimal search decision of the buyer, I use the estimated midpoint of seller search cost
ĉmi and I construct f̂ij using the estimated coefficients β̂ and γ̂. The reservation prices are
drawn randomly using the distribution in Assumtion 4.19
In all scenarios, the First stage follows the buyer optimal search strategy derived in Sec-
19 Unfortunately, the data is not of sufficient size to estimate and sample from the joint distribution of the
Zi, Ñi, {Ni}, Xi, and (ci − ci). Therefore, counterfactuals represent the effect of information frictions
on the a sample of markets I observe.
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tion 1.3. In the Random available and Random scenarios, the sellers are ex-ante identical,
and the distribution of Ŝ2:ni is derived appropriately. In the Random scenario, the buyer
is also not sure if the searched seller is available or not. From the data, I find the prob-
ability a notified seller is available for the given job, which I assume the buyer knows.
Using this, I modify the expected utility from adding the nth seller by multiplying it by
the probability that he is available.
In the Second stage, the buyer may form a match with a seller from the optimal search
set. In the Directional available scenario, this is the ni sellers with the highest f̂ij . In
the random scenarios, the sellers are identical ex-ante and I construct the search set using
draws from a uniform distribution on U [0, 1]. For the Random available scenario, I take
the sellers with the top ni random draws within the available set {Ni}. For the Random
scenario, I take the sellers with the top ni random draws within the notified set {Ñi}. In
all cases, a match is formed with the highest surplus available seller whenever si1 ≥ 0.
In scenario Frictionless, the buyer observes the match surplus sij and his search set is de
facto the set of available sellers {Ni}. He is matched with the highest surplus seller in
{Ni} whenever this seller generates a positive surplus: si1 ≥ 0.
1.6.2 Results
The results from the counterfactuals can be found in Table 1.6. The outcomes of Directed
available, which represents how the platform is organized currently, are very similar to
those presented in Table 1.1. This indicates that the estimated coefficients and search
cost are a good fit. In particular, the uncoditional probability of search in the data is 0.61
percent, while in the simulated counterfactual this is also 0.61 percent; the probability of
a match, conditional on search, is 0.44 percent in the data, and 0.46 in the simulation.
Slightly more sellers are searched in the data: 1.21 versus 1.30 overall, and 2.09 versus
2.12, conditional on search.
Next, consider the Random available scenario. Compared to Directed available, note that
the probability of search is much lower (0.22 versus 0.61), but the number of searches is
higher (4.02 versus 2.12) conditional on search. The reason is the following. In Random
available search, the sellers appear identical to the buyer in the First stage. The marginal
benefit of search is lower initially than in the Directed available scenario, where the buyer
can start his search with the better sellers. As a result, buyers with higher search costs
who search in the Directed available scenario will not search in the Random available
scenario, as the initial marginal benefit is not sufficient to offset the cost. The marginal
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benefit of search in the Random available scenario also decreases less quickly than in
the Directed available, where the buyer exhausts the better sellers and is quickly left with
bad ones. Buyers who search in the Random available will search for longer both because
they have lower search costs on average and because the marginal benefit of search does
not decrease as quickly as in the Directed available scenario.
The ex-ante probability of a match is substantially lower in the Random available scenario
- only 0.11. However, conditional on search, the probabilities of a match in the Directed
available and Random available scenarios are comparable. Overall, the results indicate
that both buyers and sellers benefit significantly from the seller profile and reputation
information, as more buyers are inclined to search, which leads to more matches overall.
Buyers also search less intensely, and therefore at a total lower cost, when they know
more about the sellers.
The completely Random scenario fares very badly compared to the previous two, with
almost no search and very few matches. The function of extracting seller availability is
essential to the functioning of this specific marketplace. Any fee or design feature that
decreases the incentives for sellers to indicate their availability would be ill advised.
Next, consider the Frictionless scenario, where seither the marketplace manages to in-
centivize the sellers to reveal their private reservation prices at the onset of the game or
it lowers buyer search costs to zero. The overall probability of a match is 0.61, or more
than twice the unconditional match probability in the status quo. The increase in number
of matches is limited by the sellers’ outside employment opportunities. This is a partial
equilibrium result: it is likely that a platform with frictions would attract more buyers,
and the sellers would eventually become less reliant on their outside demand.
The counterfactual results also allow me to say something about how match efficiency is
affected by the information frictions. In theory, contacting sellers at random could both
lead to higher or lower match surplus compared to directional search. This is because the
seller ordering by the net output f is not the same as the ordering by the match surplus s,
which is not observed at search. For jobs that result in a match in both Directed available
and Random available scenarios, the match surplus is 3 percent lower if the buyers do not
observe seller characteristics. In other words, the inefficiency stemming from not fully ob-
serving s at the search stage is not substantial, conditional on a match being formed. The
same exercise in reverse shows that surplus increases by 22 percent when buyers observe
reservation prices for matches formed under both the Frictionless and Directed available
scenarios. This reveals a significant potential for improvement in match efficiency if more
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information on seller reservation prices is made public or costless to access.
Table 1.6: Counterfactual analysis results.
Frictionless Directed Random Random
available available
N. sellers searched - 1.30 0.90 0.002
Pr(Search) - 0.61 0.22 0.001
N. sellers searched | Search - 2.12 4.02 1.21
Pr(Match) 0.61 0.28 0.11 0.000
Pr(Match|Search) - 0.46 0.51 0.43
Change in surplus 22 - -3
relative to Directed available (%)
1.7 Conclusion
As we see more service markets moving their activity online, the availability of data and
the scope for improving the economic outcomes in such settings open up many interest-
ing research questions. The contribution of this paper is to model structurally for the first
time how a buyer-seller match is formed, given the special features of service markets:
small and differentiated participants, private seller information, and costly buyer search. I
explicitly the model information frictions associated with seller fixed capacity - availabil-
ity and reservation price - in a general way that can apply to other similar environments.
Both oDesk and AirBnB experience a significant impact on the match outcome from sell-
ers rejecting buyers due to preferences. The model can be further enriched by price and
offer data, which would allow to estimate search costs without assumptions on how the
match surplus is allocated and to identify separately how certain characteristics affect the
output and the average seller reservation price.
The structural model allows me to construct counterfactual information scenarios and to
evaluate the efficiency contribution of the different features of the online marketplace.
Information on seller availability has a substantial impact on all outcomes, and any de-
sign or fee structure that affects this should be carefully considered. Lack of information
on seller characteristics and experience does not substantially affect match efficiency for
those matches that would be formed if this information were present. However, this it
greatly affects the number of sellers who search and the duration of search with its asso-
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ciated total search costs. Removing the last information friction, the private seller reser-
vation prince, has the potential to double the number of matches formed on the platform
and to significantly improve efficiency for already existing matches.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Job descriptive statistics
Table 1.7: Jobs buyer expected start.
Freq. Percent
After reviewing offers 185 4.44
Immediately 564 13.53
In 2 days 806 19.34
In 2 months 396 9.50
In 2 weeks 1,267 30.41
Just checking offers 456 10.94




Table 1.8: Jobs buyer proposed budget.















Table 1.9: Job categories.
Category Freq. Percent
Architecture and design 59 1.42
Bathroom repair 475 11.40
Building restoration and insulation 227 5.45
Carpentry 188 4.51
Cleaning services 56 1.34
Construction 253 6.07
Demolish, clean and transport 61 1.46
Doors and barriers 157 3.77
Dry construction 133 3.19
Electrical repairs 288 6.91
Equipment repair 98 2.35
Floors: parquet and tiles 295 7.08
Furniture 234 5.62
Kitchen repair 103 2.47
Landscaping 37 0.89
Metalworking 36 0.86
Painting and decoration 493 11.83
Roof repairs 282 6.77
Sewage and sanitation 390 9.36
Smithery services 92 2.21




Second order condition check
Using our distributional Assumption 4 and the estimated f̂ for each job, I calculate the
marginal benefit of search for each job for up to 10 available sellers. I follow the optimal
seller search rule, by which the buyer adds sellers to the search set in order of decreasing
f̂ . Let n be the number of sellers in the search set. According to the results in the table
below, the marginal benefit of search is decreasing as more sellers are added to the search
set.
Table 1.10: Average change in the marginal benefit of search for the jobs in our sample.
Obs. Average change
MB(n=2)-MB(n=1) 3,414 1.29
- % obs. where this is negative 29
MB(n=3)-MB(n=2) 2,737 -0.28
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=4)-MB(n=3) 2,155 -0.12
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=5)-MB(n=4) 1,718 -0.06
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=6)-MB(n=5) 1,363 -0.04
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=7)-MB(n=6) 1,112 -0.03
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=8)-MB(n=7) 910 -0.02
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=9)-MB(n=8) 748 -0.02
- % obs. where this is negative 100
MB(n=10)-MB(n=9) 601 -0.01
- % obs. where this is negative 100
The exception is going from 1 sellers to 2 sellers. Searching 0 and 1 sellers gives the
buyer expected utility of zero. In the first case, this is because he takes his outside option,
which I set to zero for all buyers. In the second case, because he seller extracts all the
surplus. Therefore, MB(n = 1) = 0. In the cases where MB(n = 2) > 0, the buyer
will search n > 0 sellers. In the cases where MB(n = 2) < 0, the buyer is indifferent
between searching 0 and 1 sellers.
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MLE derivation
The sample of M jobs is comprised of independent observations, indexed by i. Each job
can have one of the following outcomes: either no one is hired, or one of the contacted
sellers is hired. Let the probability of the first event be Pr(Yi = 0), and the probability
that seller j ∈ {ni} is hired be Pr(Yi = j). Let dij be an indicator equal to 1 when buyer
i hires seller j, and zero otherwise. The indicator for the event that no one is hired is
di0 = 1−
∑j=ni










The likelihood of any particular observation in the sample is the above probability ex-
pressed as a function of the unknown parameters γ and β, conditional on the set of co-
variates: Xi = Xi1, ..., Xini and Zi, as well as the set of contacted sellers {ni}. By
independence of the individual observations i, the likelihood of the full sample is the
product of the individual probabilities of the observations:

















P (Yi = j)
dij
)
The MLE estimator works by maximizing L(γ, β|X,Z, {n}) with respect to the param-
eters γ, β. The first step is to derive the closed form expressions for the two events
Pr(Yi = 0) and Pr(Yi = j). First, consider the event of hiring seller j with proba-
bility Pr(Yi = j) . From match stability, I know that this event will take place under the
following two conditions: no better match can be formed with any other available seller
and both buyer and seller are better off in the match than unmatched. The probability of
hiring seller j is therefore the following:
Pr(Yi = j) = Pr(Sij > 0 ∪ Sij > Sik, ∀k 6= j)
The first part of the probability is a condition on the level of the net match surplus: it must
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be positive in order to at least compensate the buyer and seller for giving up their outside
options. It will allows to identify the overall level of surplus generated by the match,
hence both the coefficients on variables Xij that differ across sellers and the coefficients
of the variables Zi that are constant across buyer-seller pairs. Let −R = ρ and express
this as:
fij + ρij > 0 ⇔ ρij > −fij
The second part of the probability states that the surplus created by seller j is greater than
the surplus created by any of the other sellers k 6= j. This is a condition on the difference
between the match surplus generated by the different sellers, and therefore it identifies
coefficients of variables whose values differ across sellers, the Xij . Consider comparing
two alternatives j and k, implying:
fij + ρij > fik + ρik ⇔ ρ̂ijk = ρij − ρik > −(fij − fik) = −f̂ijk
where ρ̂ is the difference between two randomly drawn realizations of ρ and f̂ is the
difference between two net match outputs. I can therefore re-write Pr(Yi = j) as:
Pr(Yi = j) = Pr(ρij > −fij ∪ ρ̂ijk > −f̂ijk, ∀k 6= j)
The two events in this probability are not independent because the realization of the ran-
dom variable ρij enters both. Using the distributional assumption for ρ, I derive the closed
form for the joint distribution of the random variables ρ and ρ̂. To simplify the exposition,
I present the derivation for the case where ni = 2. The joint distribution of ρ1 and ρ2,
both distributed independently and identically by a Type 1 Extreme value distribution, is
the product of the marginals:




Now, consider the following transformation: ρ = h1(ρ1, ρ2) = ρ1 and ρ̂ = h2(ρ1, ρ2) =
ρ1 − ρ2. With a slight abuse of notation, the inverse transformation functions are ρ1 =
h−11 (ρ, ρ̂) = ρ and ρ2 = h
−1
2 (ρ, ρ̂) = ρ− ρ̂.




































The joint probability distribution of the transformed random variables ρ and ρ̂ is:
gρ,ρ̂(a, b) = gρ1,ρ2(h
−1
1 (a, b), h
−1




Using this, I derive the cumulative distribution of the following event:
































1− e−ef (1+e−f̂ )
1 + e−f̂
For a larger set of contacted sellers, the absolute value of the matrix J remains 1. Thus,
the probability Pr(Yi = j) for any number ni of contacted sellers j is:



















Now consider the event that no one is hired. When a single seller j is contacted, the
probability that he is not hired, Pr(Yi = 0), can be expressed as:
Pr(Yi = 0) = Pr(ρij < −fij) = e−e
fij
By the independence of the ρij’s across j, with ni sellers j this is simply the following:
Pr(Yi = 0, ni) =
∏
j






I construct a set of indicator variables Iij for j = 1, ..., n, where each Ij is equal to 1
whenever seller j is contacted for the job, and zero otherwise. n is the maximum number
of sellers that were ever contacted for any job. In the theoretical model, the sellers j
are ordered by descending fij for any job i, but the position/order of the sellers is not
important for the construction of the probability. This way
∑j=n
j=1 Iij = ni whenever n
sellers are contacted for job i.
Using these indicators, the MLE formula can be generalized in the following way:





Pr(Yi = j, ni) =





Consider the full form of the likelihood derived in Section 1.4. There are j cases for each
of the j sellers that can potentially be hired: dijPr(Yi = j, ni), where dij is 1 whenever j
is hired for job i and zero otherwise. In the data, any seller can take the position j for any
job i: the likelihood derivation is not affected by the seller order. With a random ordering
of the sellers, each dij can contain 1’s across the sample of observations. Thus, I would
have to code all probabilities Pr(Yi = j, ni). However, as the order/position of the sellers
does not matter for the likelihood derivation, I can simplify the problem in the following
way: for each observation i whenever someone was hired, always order that seller who
was hired first: j = 1 whenever dij = 1. Thus, only the indicator dij is ever non-zero and
all indicators dij′ for j
′ 6= j are always zero in the sample. The cases dij′Pr(Yi = j′, ni)
for any sellers j′ 6= j are always zero and drop out of the likelihood.
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MLE probabilities sum to 1
Consider the case of n = 2 and the 3 probabilities:
Pr(Y = 0, n = 2) = e−e
f1−ef2 = A











Pr(Y = 0, n = 2)+Pr(Y = 1, n = 2)+Pr(Y = 2, n = 2) =
C(1− A) + B(1− A) + BCA
BC
However, I can show that:
BC = 1− e−f1ef2 − e−f2ef1 + e−f1ef2e−f2ef1 = 1− e−f1ef2 − e−f2ef1 + e0 = B + C
Therefore, the sum of the probabilities is exhaustive:
Pr(Y = 0, n = 2) + Pr(Y = 1, n = 2) + Pr(Y = 2, n = 2) =
=




Special cases for estimating seller search costs
We have the following 5 types of jobs:
1. Jobs i for which ni < Ni and ni > 1. Both upper ĉi and lowerĉi bounds on the
search cost ci can be estimated. There are 1,036 jobs of this type.
2. Jobs i for wihch ni = Ni and ni > 1. Only the upper bound on the search cost,
ci can be estimated. The lower bound cannot be estimated because we do not have
another available seller to construct the set {ni + 1}. Therefore, ci is approximated
using a conditional average of ĉ across all other jobs i′, such that ĉi′ <= ĉi. There
are 381 jobs of this type.
3. Jobs i for which either ni = 0 or ni = 1 and N > 1. For these jobs, the buyer
is indifferent between searching 1 or 0 sellers because in both cases his expected
utility is zero. Only the lower bound on the search cost, ci can be estimated for
{ni + 1} = 2. The upper bound cannot be estimated because there cannot be
a set {ni − 1} that gives positive expected utility to the buyer. Therefore, ci is
approximated using a conditional average of ĉ across all other jobs i′, such that
ĉi′ >= ĉi. There are 2,038 jobs of this type.
4. Jobs i for which either ni = 0 or ni = 1 and N = 1. The buyer gets zero expected
utility in either ni = 0 or ni = 1, and cannot search more than that because there are
no more available sellers. Therefore, neither search cost bound can be estimated. ci
is approximated using a conditional average of ĉ across all other jobs i′, such that
ĉi′ >= ĉi. ci is approximated using a conditional average of ĉ across all other jobs
i′, such that ĉi′ <= ĉi. There are 737 jobs of this type.
40
Robustness checks
Table 1.11: Results from the MLE estimations with seller fixed ef-
fects.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Xij
Seller percent positive reviews 0.860*** 0.437*
(0.173) (0.176)
Seller marketplace tenure -0.083 -0.179**
(0.050) (0.059)
Seller total times hired 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Message length -0.070** 0.032
(0.027) (0.029)
Message time -0.143** 0.038
(0.051) (0.126)
Zi
Job budget -0.252*** -0.261***
(0.069) (0.070)
Job start -0.350*** -0.363***
(0.078) (0.079)
High demand season -0.328*** -0.295***
(0.084) (0.086)
Year fixed effects Yes*** Yes***
Job category fixed effects Yes*** Yes***
Seller fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Constant -2.228* -1.751 -0.165 -0.248
(1.031) (1.036) (1.297) (1.220)
Likelihood -2,347 -2,327 -2,073 -2,066
Observations 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Continuous variables







Using data from an online home services marketplace, we study reputational in-
centives in an environment with heterogeneous seller demand fluctuations. We em-
pirically corroborate the hypothesis that sellers with an upcoming demand downturn
value their reputation less, which in turn affects their effort negatively. Our robust-
ness checks rule out that this is due to selection of sellers into jobs, higher costs of
seller effort, or adverse selection. Neither the economic literature nor the platforms
designing reputation systems have sufficiently considered seller heterogeneity and
the optimal way to account for it in terms of the information available to the buyer
and the seller incentives.
42
2.1 Introduction
Online platforms have successfully expanded the economic activity in many diverse mar-
kets such as the sale and re-sale of various new and used goods (eBay, Amazon) and
short-term rentals of cars and property (Uber, AirBnB). These markets were previously
impeded by the issues of anonymity and lack of trust: the sellers and buyers did not
know anything about each other, and their interaction was one-time only. The incentives
to cheat, by providing a low quality good or service, were significant enough to make
economic activity in these markets non-existent or significantly depressed.
To a large extent, the success of online platforms can be credited to their employment of
reputation systems. Reputation systems (or reputation mechanisms) are a set of rules by
which buyer-seller interactions are reviewed publicly.1 Even if individual buyers interact
only once with the seller, the mechanism establishes a dependence between current and
future demand. Consider a setting with moral hazard, where effort is costly and unob-
served. By subscribing to a marketplace with a public reputation system, the seller agrees
that the outcome of all interactions is made public, which in turn informs the decision
of potential buyers. Knowing that the sellers value the ability of reputation to generate
demand in future time periods, the buyers are less hesitant to hire them in the current
period.
Despite how ubiquitous reputation systems have become, the approach to their design is
still ”one size fits all”, with limited consideration of seller heterogeneity and the economic
environment more generally. The predominant way in which individual reviews are ag-
gregated and displayed is by taking a simple average, thus making each review equally
improtant. For example, the biggest review systems for restaurants - Tripadvisor, Yelp
and GoogleMaps - use this simple approach. Amazon is one of the few online retailers
that recognize the need for a more fine-tuned reputation system: it gives higher visibil-
ity of reviews received in the last 12 months to prevent sellers lowering quality when a
large amount of positive reviews is already accumulated. In their working paper on the
economics and the tech industry, Athey and Luca (2018) note that platforms have to con-
sider more carefully the way in which review information is made available to buyers,
and how this affects seller incentives. Economists have only recently started to addressed
1 The role of reputation is not new to economic theory and it is studied in the following two cases of
asymmetric information with regards to the seller. In settings with unobserved seller actions (moral
hazard), reputation is a sanctioning device that motivates the seller to take appropriate actions. In settings
with unobserved seller types (adverse selection), reputation is a signaling device that reveals the true type
of the seller.
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optimality of reputation systems in specific economic environments, and how this can be
achieved by review aggregation and display (see Dai, Jin, Lee and Luca (2018)).
In this paper, we provide evidence that when the economic environment and actors are
not homogeneous, a simple reputation system fails to incentivize a consistent effort level.
We consider an environment with demand fluctuations and sellers who are differentially
exposed to them. Because reputation works by linking current and future demand, when
future transaction opportunities are few, the value placed on a good reputation by the
seller is low. This lowers the incentive to exert effort, which in turn leads to a lower prob-
ability that the buyer is satisfied by a project’s outcome. Consistent with the hypothesis,
the empirical results indicate that the sellers who experience a more significant drop in
demand in future months are less likely to receive a positive review.
We work with proprietary data from MaistorPlus, a Bulgarian online marketplace for
home services. MaistorPlus is similar to other well-known platforms connecting clients,
or buyers, and professionals, or sellers, such as oDesk (IT and business professionals),
TaskRabbit (for home owners and low skilled labor), and Thumbtack (for a large variety
of local services). The seller’s account has information on his scope of expertise, but most
importantly it contains a public record of his activity on the platform: the number of times
he was hired and the corresponding average of the received reviews.2 This information is
important in determining if he is contacted and eventually hired by buyers. Our prelim-
inary empirical analysis demonstrates the positive returns to reputation when demand is
high.
The source of variation in our data comes from the seasonality of demand for certain
jobs, which is due to weather conditions permitting outdoor work and to weather-proofing
homes for the fall, winter and spring seasons. The majority of jobs are posted between
July and November, which we call the high demand season. At the same time, the sellers
themselves specialize in different services and this means that they are heterogeneously
exposed to the demand seasonality. For example, someone specializing in plumbing ser-
vices would see a more steady flow of demand compared to someone specializing in roof
repairs, which mostly take place in the summer and autumn. As a result, the seasonal
fluctuation of demand, which translates to a reputational incentive to exert effort, varies
at the level of the individual seller. The analysis focuses on the seller’ behavior at the
end of the high demand season, when the discounted sum of work opportunities in the
2 We refer to the individual interaction feedback as a review, while the cumulative of the reviews is the
seller’s reputation. In this sense, the review is an incremental change in reputation.
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immediate future is the lowest.3
Our measure of demand heterogeneity is seller demand Smoothness: the average monthly
demand in the low period relative to the average monthly demand in the high period. A
smoothness measure closer to one implies lower exposure to seasonality, but although
most sellers are affected at least to some extent. We construct this variable using demand
in the categories in which the seller is active at any point in time in our sample.4 This way,
Smoothness measures the exogenous demand conditions faced by the seller rather than
that seller’s endogenous activity. This avoids the following reverse causality problem:
after a positive review, the sellers may increase (or decrease) his activity, which in turn
would affect the calculation of demand smoothness in that period.
On its own, the end of the high demand season is associated with a lower likelihood of a
positive review across all sellers. We do not attribute this finding to the imminent reduc-
tion in overall demand, as the end of the high demand season is potentially associated with
other non-effort determinants of project success, such as the disruption in material sup-
plies, bad weather or last-minute projects that are harder to perform well. By interacting
seller-specific demand Smoothness and the High season end, we are sure to find an effect
which is driven by heterogeneous demand conditions at the level of the individual seller.
We find that the sellers whose demand drops substantially in the upcoming low demand
season are less likely to receive a positive review. The average seller in our sample has
a 4 percent lower probability of a positive review in the last months of the high season.
For sellers with low demand smoothness at the 10th percentile of the distribution, we see
a drop of 16 percent, while sellers at the 90th percentile see an increase of 18 percent in
the probability of a positive review. The results in the reverse direction are weekly signif-
icant in some specifications: the end of the low demand season is associated with a higher
likelihood of a positive review, but less so for sellers with more seasonal demand.
Given the current reputation mechanism, our results can be used to inform buyers better
about seller incentives. Consider roof repairs, a highly seasonal job due to weather con-
ditions. Towards the end of the high demand season, a homeowner would be better off
to hire a seller specializing in plumbing but also fixing roofs (high Smoothness), rather
than the roof specialist (low Smoothness), all else equal. Alternatively, the homeowner
looking at the profile of the roof repairman should not be as concerned by a negative re-
3 The reverse effect - a higher probability of a positive review towards the end of the low demand season
for high seasonality sellers - is also present in the results but significant only in certain specifications.
4 In the context of buyer-seller interaction structure on the marketplace, the seller activity in a category is
indicated by the seller responding to a job in that particular category.
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view that was received in November as much as by one received in June, especially if he
is looking to hire the roof repairman at the start of the high demand season. The results
are suggest that design the system itself may be optimized in a way that provides more
consistent incentives for seller effort. For example, the reputation system can aggregate
seller reviews through a weighted average that puts higher weights on reviews received
under circumstances similar to the ones facing the particular seller.
Our hypothesis assumes implicitly that the channel through which demand affects the
outcome is seller effort. We perform a number of robustness checks to rule out alternative
channels of causality. In a first robustness check, we consider selection of professionals
into jobs, where some jobs require more effort, especially towards the end of the high
demand season. We also rule out the possibility that sellers who drop out of the platform
at the end of the high season, and may be of a ”bad” type, drive our results. Additionally,
we propose two specifications that test indirectly whether the cost of effort, as a function
of demand or of the size of the seller, confounds the results.
Our work is related to the new literature which uses data from online marketplaces to test
formal reputation models, to study reputation dynamics, and to evaluate the effectiveness
of reputation systems. The surveys of Bajari and Hortacsu (2004), Bar-Isaac and Tadelis
(2008), Cabral (2012) and most recently Tadelis (2016) document this body of work. A
substantial number of papers in the literature attempt to test whether the source of in-
formational asymmetry in the market is due to moral hazard or adverse selection. For
example, Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) examine the dynamics of seller reputation on eBay
and find strong evidence for moral hazard: the first negative feedback received lowers
the returns to reputation once and for all, and sellers react by lowering their effort and
eventually exiting. However, the authors cannot rule out an underlying moral hazard plus
adverse selection model. While the objective of our paper is not to rule out adverse selec-
tion, it is seller effort, rather than seller type, which is affected by the demand fluctuation.
In the robustness checks, we rule out two alternative explanations for the effect we find
that are based on seller type (seller size and exiting sellers).
The effectiveness of reputation systems has raised considerable research interest, with the
majority of work focusing on the ability of reputation mechanisms to elicit truthful re-
views. For example, Fradkin, Grewal and Holtz (2018) investigate the informativeness of
reviews on a hospitality marketplace, AirBnB, where review reciprocity causes significant
bias. Horton and Golden (2015) also document reputation inflation, on oDesk, a service
marketplace. Only recently have economists considered more explicitly how seller re-
views should be aggregated, with the objective of providing future buyers with the most
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up to date information and sellers with the right incentives. The work of Dai, Jin, Lee
and Luca (2018) considers the optimal design of a reputation system in an environment
with changing service quality. Because quality is exogenous, the effect of the reputation
mechanism design on seller incentives is not a part of their analysis. We are not aware of
other empirical work studying the heterogeneity of reputational incentives across sellers.
Although their work concerns the credit rating industry, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013)
are closer to the topic of our work as they investigate how the exogenous variation of
the business cycle, a common demand trend, drives reputational incentives for Credit
Rating Agencies (CRAs). The value of reputation is shown to depend on the economic
fundamentals varying over the business cycle. Ratings accuracy is counter-cyclical as
effort is lower during periods of high economic activity, which is consistent with our
findings that the probability of a positive review is influenced by demand fluctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on our data source, the
MaistorPlus marketplace, including information on the categories of jobs available and
their seasonal variation, the sellers and the reputation mechanism. Section 2.3 presents
the empirical implementation, as well as the results and robustness checks. Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 MaistorPlus and data generation
We work with company data form the MaistorPlus marketplace, founded in Sofia, Bul-
garia in 2012, and our sample covers the period between January 2013 and July 2015.5
The marketplace connects buyers to subscribing home service sellers and is financed by
sellers’ subscription fees and by advertisements.
2.2.1 Job activity and reviews
Demand on the marketplace is generated by buyers who sign up freely and post what
we call jobs: home repairs projects for which they want to hire a service provider. We
observe 4,167 jobs, as well as data at the job-seller level of interaction. The total value of
all jobs in our sample is 12.6 million Euros.
5 The website of the market place is: http://maistorplus.com/
47
The buyer provides a description of the job, specifies the job category (such as carpentry,
roof repairs, construction, etc), an estimated budget, and a start date. All sellers active in
that job category are potentially available and notified of the job; those who are actually
available can message the buyer. The buyer is free to inspect the seller profiles and their
reputation when he decides who to contact or hire. In the data, the buyers contact 1.3
sellers on average, and hire someone in 27 percent of the time. This information can be
found in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Job activity on MaistorPlus
Data Observations Per job
Distinct jobs 4,167 -
- potentially available sellers 333,639 80.0
- available sellers 22,379 5.37
- contacted sellers 5,354 1.28
- hired sellers 1,126 0.27
- positive reviews (total and per hire) 749 0.66
- total value (Euro) 12,650,600 2,785
Only buyers who have hired a seller through the marketplace are allowed to post a review,
which can be positive, negative, or neutral, or nothing (1/0/-1/.). As it is customary in
the empirical reputations literature, we separate the reviews into positive and non-positive
reviews.6 Out of 1,126 jobs where someone was hired in our sample, we observe that the
buyer left a positive review in 749 cases.7
For buyer reviews to carry information, it is necessary that the good or service in question
can be competently evaluated by the buyer. Services performed by expert professionals,
such as home repairs, can have similar aspects to credence goods as the buyer only ob-
serves whether the problem is fixed, so to say, but not the quality of the work or whether
it was overperscribed. Seller professionalism, as well as explanations of how the prob-
lem arose and how to present future problems, are therefore highly valued by the buyers
and the predominant themes of the textual part of the reviews. Providing this observable
aspect of the service is still costly and affected by fluctuations in the value of reputation.
6 Consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Nosko and Tadelis (2015) and Dellarocas and Wood (2008)),
we view no feedback and neutral feedback as a non-positive review.
7 The buyers can also post a textual review of the interaction. However, we do not work with this metric
because it is highly collinear with the point review.
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2.2.2 Service sellers
There is a total of 864 active sellers in our sample, of whom 251 were hired at least once.
They subscribe to one of three fixed-term plans, ordered by their annual cost: Start (100
Euro), Pro (150 Euro)and Pro+ (250 Euro). The more costly the plan, the more options
the sellers have for the number of categories in which they are active (3/4/6 categories).
The sellers can change these at any time and at no cost, potentially adjusting their activity
to seasonal demand fluctuations. While the buyers can infer, to some extent, the seller
size and scope of activity by observing the current active categories, they do not observe
history of category changes, and therefore seller’s demand smoothness.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the experience of the sellers present in the main
analysis: the sellers who were hired at least once in the duration of our sample. The aver-
age seller is hired 4.5 times and has 3 positive reviews, both with high standard deviation.
The average time between the last two messages of interest is about 9 days, but some
sellers appear to have not been available much longer. The average activity span (time be-
tween the first and last message observed in the data) is 19 months out of 38 months in the
data. Periods of high inactivity are likely for sellers who work in seasonal job categories,
and among those who use the marketplace relatively rarely because they have sufficient
job referrals from outside of the marketplace.
Table 2.2: The experience of the MaistorPlus sellers on the marketplace.
At latest observed time period: Mean St. dev Min Max
- activity span on marketplace (months) 19.19 8.56 0 30
- time between last two messages (days) 8.65 39.5 0 362
- total times hired 4.48 7.02 1 49
- total positive reviews 2.98 5.17 0 38
2.2.3 Seasonality and reputation
Demand in the home services sector is highly seasonal because some types of services,
for example outdoor work, can only be done during the months when the weather permits.
There are also services that are demanded right before the start of fall and winter, such as
services related to heating and insulation. Examples of demand seasonality in the different
job categories can be found in Figure 2.1.
To establish the duration of the high demand season, we look at the number of jobs posted
49
Figure 2.1: Number of jobs posted by both in different categories, year 2014
on the platform each month during the period 2013-2015, N. jobs. Table 2.3 has the re-
sults from two regressions that help us do that. In the first regression S1, we use indica-
tors for the individual months. Months July through November experience a significantly
higher level of demand compared to other months. We define a seasonal variable High
season equal to 1 for months months July-November and use that in the second regression
S2. The explanatory power of S2 is still very high, and in fact the adjusted R2 is higher
compared to S1.
Implicit in our hypothesis that demand conditions affect effort is the conjecture that repu-
tation is more valuable when demand is high. Ex-ante, it is not obvious whether reputation
is more valuable during high or low demand periods. On the one hand, the value of rep-
utation could be higher in the high demand period because there are more buyers with a
high willingness to pay for a seller with a high reputation. On the other hand, reputation
could be more valuable in the low demand season when there are fewer jobs and more
intense competition between the sellers.
We resolve this question by going to the data. We construct a panel at the professional-
date level and a variable measuring the unconditional returns to reputation as the number
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Table 2.3: Monthly demand on the marketplace
and the High season dummy.





























Year fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.88 0.85
R2 Adjusted 0.81 0.83
N. observations 36 36
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
Robust standard errors.
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of times a seller was contacted by buyers in a given month, Monthly contacts.8 The
variables of interest in specification C1 are our measure of reputation, Percent positive
reviews, lagged one month, and the High season indicator. Their interaction is included
in specification C2. Other control variables include the seller’s activity on the platform
during that time (how many jobs he was invited to, how many times he was available),
and date and seller fixed effects. The estimates are presented in Table 2.4. The benefits
of a good reputation are indeed positive: the number of monthly contacts increases with
Percent positive reviews. The results of the second regression support the claim that repu-
tation is more valuable when demand is high as the coefficient on the interaction between
Percent positive reviews and High season is positive and significant. If Percent positive
reviews increases by 20 percentage points, Monthly contacts in the High demand period
increase by 1.3 percent.
Table 2.4: Returns to reputation and the High season.
Dependent variable Monthly contacts Monthly contacts
Specification (C1) (C2)
Independent variables
Percent positive reviews 0.038* 0.016
(0.020) (0.021)
High season 0.115*** 0.107***
(0.018) (0.018)
High season*Percent positive reviews 0.065***
(0.014)








N. observations 16,912 16,912
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust standard errors. The continuous
dependent variables and regressors (except Percent positive reviews) are transformed by taking
their natural logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient on
Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
8 The hiring decision is joint and depends on other potential projects that the seller may be considering.
Theregore, we prefer to use as dependent variable the number of times the buyers have expressed prefer-
ence for hiring the seller, i.e. Monthly contacts.
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2.3 Econometric analysis
Our econometric analysis is based on the difference in differences methodology. The re-
sults indicate that indeed sellers who experience a drop in demand are less likely to receive
a positive review towards the end of the high season. We also see a weekly significant
result in the reverse direction: sellers who experience an increase in demand are more
likely to receive a positive review towards the end of the low demand season. We perform
a number of robustness checks that corroborate this conclusion.
2.3.1 Demand smoothness
Central to empirical analysis is the variable measuring how the seller’s heterogeneous
demand fluctuates, Smoothnessi. Let k denote the individual job categories and i de-
note the sellers. The data allows us to observe the set {Ki} of categories that seller i is
available in. For example, Construction is one such category for seller i if the seller has
expressed availability to a job in that category. Let Demandk,Season denote the number of
unique jobs in category k during the respective season.9 As the platform is still growing
during the period of observation, we group two Low and two High seasons to improve
the representativeness of the demand pattern. Assuming that demand grows multiplica-
tively, our definition of Smoothnessi is not distorted by this. For the demand in the High
season, we use the jobs posted on the marketplace during July 2014-Nov 2014 and July
2015-Nov 2015. For demand during the Low season, we use jobs during Dec 2013-June
2014 and Dec 2014 - June 2015.
For the seller i, the monthly demand during any given season, Demandi,Season, is the sum
of demand over his active categories {Ki} in that season, Demandk,Season, divided by the
duration of the season.10 The seller’s demand Smoothnessi is the ratio of of demand in
the low season to demand in the high season. Constructed this way, the demand measure
is exogenous to the seller’s actual activity and reputation. In other words, Smoothnessi
is defined as:
9 Our data rangers from January 2013 to December 2015 but there was a significant change in the market-
place rules in July 2015. The change affects the activity of the sellers, hence we cannot use data after it
for the main analysis. However, it does not affect demand incidence.
10 The low and high demand seasons have different duration, 5 and 7 months respectively. Dividing the
total demand by the season length is necessary to avoid a mechanical difference due to the different
length of the seasons.
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A demand Smoothnessi value of 1 would indicate no fluctuation: seller i faces the same
demand conditions during the Lowseasont and the Highseasont. The lower is the value
of Smoothnessi, the more the seller is exposed to the seasonality of demand. Most sellers
experience a drop in demand during the low season, and the average value of smoothness
is 0.59. A few sellers experience reverse seasonality with Smoothnessi maximum of
1.59. Figure 2.2 contains the histogram of Smoothnessi. The distribution is can be
described as relatively bell-shaped with a longer tail on the right.
2.3.2 Main specification and results
We test the hypothesis that seller demand heterogeneity affects seller incentives to exert
effort, which in turn affects the probability that a job is done well and the seller receiving
a positive review. This effect should be especially strong at the end of the high demand
season, when the discounted sum of future demand is the lowest.
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To this end, we work with a sample of completed jobs, indexed by the hired seller i, the
date defined as month-year t, and the job characteristics k. The outcome variable of in-
terest is the probability that the seller i receives a positive review for job k in period t,
Pr(Positive review)ikt. The variable High season endt which indicates if the job was
posted in the two months of the high demand season (October and November) and it is the
common trend among all sellers. We interact it with seller Smoothnessi to test whether
sellers heterogeneous demand fluctuation affect the probability of Pr(Positive review)ikt.
Specification (1) is:
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2Smoothnessi ∗High season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ǫikt
The coefficient of interest is β2. If it is positive, sellers with lower demand fluctuations (a
higher Smoothnessi) are more likely to receive a positive review at the end of the high
season. Or, the more the seller is exposed to seasonal demand fluctuations, the less likely
he is to receive a positive review at the end of the high season.
As controls, we include covariates measuring seller experience and a number of fixed
effects. The variable Xit is the Percent positive reviews. We also include fixed effects
for each seller i, for the job category, budget and start date of the job k, and for the time
period t. Since Smoothnessi is constant over the sellers, it is absorbed by the seller fixed
effects.
In specification (2), we allow for the complementary effect by including Low season endt
dummy equal to 1 for the months May and June and its interaction with Smoothnessi.
We expect coefficient β4 to be negative, suggesting sellers who do not experience signif-
icant demand fluctuations are is less likely to make exceptional effort to improve their
reputation before the beginning of the high season.
Specification (2) is:
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2Smoothnessi ∗High season endt
+ β3Low season endt + β4Smoothnessi ∗ Low season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ǫikt
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We employ a linear probability model to make the interpretation of the estimated ef-
fects easier. Our estimates of (1) and (2) can be found in Table 2.5.11 We find that the
High season endt is associated with a general drop in the probability of a positive re-
view. This effect is countered by demand Smoothnessi, as the estimated coefficient on
the interaction is positive. For the median seller with Smoothnessi = 0.57, the prob-
ability of receiving a positive review at the end of the high season is 4 percent lower:
−0.99 + 0.57 × 1.66 = −0.04. sellers at the 10th percentile see a drop of 16 percent,
while those at the 90th percentile actually see an increase of 18 percent in the probability
of positive review at the end of the high season.
The results of specification (2) are in line with specification (1), but the additional vari-
ables are not significant. It is possible that this is because of the small sample size. The
Low season endt is associated with a higher likelihood of a positive review, and sellers
with higher demand Smoothnessi are less likely to receive a positive review at the end
of the low demand season.
Conditional on the seller being hired, we find that the variable Percent positive reviews is
associated negatively with the probability of receiving another positive review. A potential
explanation is that sellers are strategic in building and using up their reputation. Strategic
reputation building is indirect evidence of moral hazard, and moral hazard as predominant
source of asymmetric information has been recorded in online environments such as eBay
by Klein, Lambetz and Stahl (2016).
2.3.3 Robustness checks
We consider the robustness of our results to alternative channels of causality: selection
between sellers and jobs, adverse selection, and cost of effort.
Selection between sellers and jobs
As already mentioned in Section 2.2, the buyers do not observe the heterogeneous sellerl
demand fluctuations, hence the opportunities for selection on the part of the buyers is
limited. However, it is possible that sellers of different Smoothnessi self-select into
different jobs k, at different times t, and this interferes with our results.
11 The results of probit and logit specifications are consistent and available upon request.
56
Table 2.5: Linear probability model for receiving a positive review.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (2)
Independent variables
High season end -0.986** -0.919**
(0.439) (0.446)
Smoothness*High season end 1.659** 1.532**
(0.653) (0.666)
Low season end 1.057
(0.860)
Smoothness*Low season end -2.319
(1.448)









N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust standard errors.
The continuous regressors (except Percent positive reviews) are transformed by
taking their natural logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elastici-
ties. The coefficient on Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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Consider the indicator Seasonal categoryk equal to 1 for jobs with high demand inci-
dence in June to November.12 It may be that jobs in seasonal categories are more difficult
to complete successfully. It is also possible that their successful completion is affected by
the time period, for example: seasonal jobs may suffer from worsening weather condi-
tions at the end of the high demand season. In addition, sellers in more seasonal lines of
work (and therefore lower demand Smoothnessi) may be more likely to take on seasonal
jobs, especially at the end of the high demand season. These effects present an alternative
relationship between the probability of a positive review and the explanatory variables
of interest: job seasonality affects the effort level needed for a positive review, and low
demand Smoothnessi sellers select into seasonal jobs towards the end of the high de-
mand season. To test this, we augment (1) by interacting the High season endt and
Smoothnessi variables individually and jointly with the Seasonal categoryi dummy.
13
Our first robustness specification (R1) is:
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2Seasonal categoryk
+ β3Smoothnessi ∗High season endt
+ β4Seasonal categoryk ∗ Smoothnessi
+ β5Seasonal categoryk ∗ Smoothnessi ∗High season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ǫikt
The results of (R1) can be found in Table 2.6. Jobs in seasonal categories are not more
or less likely to get a positive review, neither in general nor only at the end of the season.
The probability of a positive review for a seasonal job is also not affected by the demand
Smoothnessi of the hired seller, neither overall nor at the end of the high demand season.
The main effects of interest - the Highseasonendt and its interaction with Smoothnessi
- remain significant and of similar higher magnitude.
12 To classify the jobs, we regress monthly job incidence on the Highseasont dummy. These regression
are available upon request.
13 Individual category fixed effects are no longer included because of collinearity with the Seasonal cate-
gory dummy.
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Table 2.6: Robustness check with seasonal category fixed effect and inter-
actions.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R1)
Independent variables




Smoothness*High season end 1.626** 2.333***
(0.683) (0.421)




Seasonal category*Smoothness*High season end -1.310
(1.646)
Percent positive reviews -0.220*** -0.211***
(0.063) (0.061)









N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust standard errors. The
continuous regressors (except Percent positive reviews) are transformed by taking their
natural logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient
on Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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Adverse selection
In the period for which we have data, the platform is relatively young and some sellers in
our sample become inactive after a while. For these sellers, the incentive to exert effort
in the last months of their subscription is even lower, as they may be ”cashing in” their
reputation. If the end of their use of the platform coincides with the end of the high
demand period, it may be that adverse selection is partially driving our results.
We restrict our sample to only those sellers who are still active on the platform in 2015 and
2016, which brings down our observations to 867 from 1,126. The results from estimating
our model on the restricted sample, (R2), are presented in Table 2.7; all coefficients on
the variables of interest are very similar to those in our main specification. This is not
surprising because the mean of demand Smoothnessi of the two groups, the sellers who
continue to be active and those who drop out, is not statistically different.
Table 2.7: Robustness check with sellers still active in
2015 and 2016.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R2)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992** -1.035***
(0.413) (0.396)
Smoothness*High season end 1.626** 1.685***
(0.681) (0.649)
Percent positive reviews -0.220*** -0.230***
(0.062) (0.067)





Job category, budget, start Yes, Yes, Yes Yes, Yes, Yes
Time (year) Yes Yes
seller Yes Yes
R2 0.37 0.31
N. observations 1,126 867
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust
standard errors. The continuous regressors (except Percent positive
reviews) are transformed by taking their natural logarithm, and their
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient on Per-
cent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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Cost of effort
A potential confounding factor in our results is the cost of effort, which may also change
when demand is high, and differentially so for for sellers with different demand smooth-
ness. With no information on seller costs, we are unable investigate this directly. Instead,
we propose two regressions providing indirect evidence that the cost of effort is the driv-
ing factor of our results.
Firstly, we conjecture that the cost of effort fluctuates with current demand, and not with
the discounted sum of demand in future periods. In (R3), we use the full set of bi-monthly











+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ǫikt
The estimation results of (R3) indicate no evidence to support a cost of effort based on the
level of current demand. Indeed, the probability of positive review is significantly lower
only in October and November. Furthermore, we see no differential effect for sellers of
different demand Smoothnessi.
Another way to look at the issue of fluctuating costs is to consider the relationship between
the size of the seller’s operations and Smoothnessi. If sellers with lower Smoothnessi
are also smaller, they may be relatively more overstretched during the high demand sea-
son. In this sense, our estimations would be suffering from omitted variable bias, where
Smoothnessi picks up the effect of the omitted variable measuring seller cost of effort.
To remedy this, we use the mean budget size for all jobs for which the seller was available,
Average budgeti, as a metric for seller size, and interact it with the High season endt
dummy.
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Table 2.8: Robustness check with bimonthly fixed effects.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R3)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992**
(0.413)



























N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust
standard errors. Constant, Percent positive reviews and Total times
hired omitted from table for brevity.
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Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2Seasonal categoryk
+ β3Smoothnessi ∗High season endt
+ β4Average budgeti ∗High season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ǫikt
Table 2.9: Robustness check with measures of seller size.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R4)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992** -1.363
(0.415) (1.078)
Smoothness*High season end 1.626** 1.814**
(0.683) (0.705)
Percent positive reviews -0.220*** -0.222***
(0.063) (0.063)
Total times hired -0.029 -0.030
(0.037) (0.037)









N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust stan-
dard errors. The continuous regressors (except Percent positive reviews,
total offers and average budget) are transformed by taking their natural
logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The
coefficient on Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
The results of (R4) are presented in Table 2.9. Average budgeti interacted with High season endt
is not statistically significant, which suggests that our results are not suffering from bias
due to omitting seller cost of effort that is also correlated with seller demand heterogene-
ity.
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2.4 Conclusion and outlook
Reputation systems are essential for online economic activity because they provide buy-
ers with information and sellers with incentives. However, the approach to designing
such system is uniform and without much consideration for the economic environment
and seller incentive heterogeneity. The economic literature has only recently started to
consider the question of optimal aggregation and display of review information, and the
effect that would have on seller behavior. Our work aims to inform this question by
documenting how heterogeneous seller demand fluctuations lead to inconsistent effort
provision on an online services marketplace.
Apart from the general contribution of our results, there are specific implications for rep-
utation mechanism design in environments with heterogeneous demand fluctuations. For
example, firms in the tourism industry (restaurants, hotels, etc) are similarly susceptible
to heterogeneous and fluctuating demand and therefore incentives. The majority of buy-
ers in these markets, who are tourists, rely exclusively on online reputation when making
choices. Buyers choosing between hotels in tourist and residential areas may not be fully
aware of the different demand conditions, and therefore incentives, that these establish-
ments face. Making certain reviews more prominent, either by increasing their weight or




Athey, Susan, and Michael Luca. Economists (and Economics) in Tech Companies. No.
w25064. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.
Bajari, Patrick, and Ali Hortacsu. ”Economic insights from internet auctions.” Journal of
Economic Literature 42.2 (2004): 457-486.
Bar-Isaac, Heski, and Steven Tadelis. ”Seller reputation.” Foundations and Trends R© in
Microeconomics 4.4 (2008): 273-351.
Bar-Isaac, Heski, and Joel Shapiro. ”Ratings quality over the business cycle.” Journal of
Financial Economics 108.1 (2013): 62-78.
Cabral, Luis. ”Reputation on the Internet.” The Oxford handbook of the digital economy
(2012): 343-354.
Cabral, Luis, and Ali Hortacsu. ”The dynamics of seller reputation: Evidence from eBay.”
The Journal of Industrial Economics 58.1 (2010): 54-78.
Dai, Weijia, Ginger Z. Jin, Jungmin Lee and Michael Luca. Optimal aggregation of con-
sumer ratings: an application to yelp. com. No. w18567. National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2012.
Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, and Charles A. Wood. ”The sound of silence in online feedback:
Estimating trading risks in the presence of reporting bias.” Management science 54.3
(2008): 460-476.
Fradkin, Andrey, Elena Grewal, and David Holtz. ”The determinants of online review
informativeness: Evidence from field experiments on Airbnb.” (2018).
Horton, John, and Joseph Golden. ”Reputation inflation: Evidence from an online labor
market.” Work. Pap., NYU 1 (2015).
Klein, Tobias J., Christian Lambertz, and Konrad O. Stahl. ”Market transparency, adverse
selection, and moral hazard.” Journal of political economy 124.6 (2016): 1677-1713.
Nosko, Chris, and Steven Tadelis. The limits of reputation in platform markets: An empir-
ical analysis and field experiment. No. w20830. National Bureau of Economic Research,
2015.
65
Tadelis, Steven. ”Reputation and feedback systems in online platform markets.” Annual
Review of Economics 8 (2016): 321-340.
66
Chapter 3
Airline Cooperation Effects on Airfare
Distribution: An Auction Approach
Abstract
Assessing airline cooperation through its impact on aggregated prices could be
challenging due to potential issues of heteroscedasticity and heterogeneity. To prop-
erly address this question, we represent air ticket sales by a reverse auction using
individual transaction prices. Applicable to other industries where sellers compete in
prices and when only price data are available, this approach allows us to reconsider
the effect of airline alliances on the distribution of airfares in the US domestic mar-
ket: We find a statistically significant lower price mean and higher price dispersion
in markets where airlines belong to an alliance. Hence, we hope our methodology
would help competition authorities to refine their competitive analysis of cooperative
agreements among airlines but also in other industries.
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3.1 Introduction
Airline cooperation plays a unique and crucial role in the industrial organization of inter-
national and domestic air travel. Most airlines cooperate in some manner, varying from
a codeshare agreement on a particular market where airlines not operating a flight are
allowed to sell tickets on that flight, to the more integrated arrangement of an alliance.
There is no clear agreement among economists on the magnitude or/and the intensity of
the effect of cooperation among airlines on prices or welfare. Because airlines face con-
sumers with large heterogeneity in their tastes in terms of service features or preferred
purchasing date, they implement complex pricing practices to better extract consumer’s
surplus, which blurs studying the impact of cooperation on prices. To address this ques-
tion, the analysis usually proposed in the literature is somehow incomplete as it mainly
focuses on how aggregated prices are affected by cooperation. However, as aggregated
figures ignore the consumer heterogeneity, their use can create heteroskedasticy which
can affect the precision of the measure of impact of cooperation, an issue which is well
recognized in most of the literature on airlines.1
Here, to contribute to the empirical assessment of airline cooperation’s impact on prices,
we propose an original approach that allows the use of individual transaction prices to
estimate the airfare distribution rather than studying aggregated figures. We argue that
the ticket sales process is adequately approximated by price competition, and this allows
us to ground our theoretical model on the equivalence between Bertrand competition and
the reverse English auction, a result well known in the literature. In this setup, there is
one buyer (the passenger or auctioneer) and multiple sellers (the airlines or bidders) who
compete to sell their service by proposing prices; fare are observable by all the sellers
who can modify their prices according to their competitors’ offers.2 Then, the transaction
price at which the passenger buys the ticket is equal to the highest reservation cost among
the competitors, where the reservation cost is the minimum acceptable compensation for
the airline.3 Hence, this result allows us to interpret the observed airfares as winning bids
and to analyze their distribution by methods pertaining to the econometrics of auctions.
1 For instance, Blundell and Stoker (2005)’s survey presents techniques that allows to attenuate the het-
erogeneity problems created when using aggregated figures in specific scenarios.
2 Note that Klemperer (2004) states that theoretically such a “process corresponds exactly to the standard
ascending auction among bidders competing to buy an object.” He therefore refers to “ascending auc-
tions” even for reverse auctions. We prefer to use the term “reverse auction” which is more coherent with
our context.
3 We use the term of reservation cost (instead of simply cost) to emphasize that we consider both operating
and opportunity costs as explained in Section 3.3.
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The empirical auction literature has developed several methods for the estimation of auc-
tion outcomes.4 Our contribution relies on applying for the first time such methods to
describe an internet sale process. In the recent years, we have seen a spectacular increase
in the number and popularity of search engines that compare prices among different firms
and in the deployment of yield management techniques.5 More and more sectors see
their goods and services traded online, with near-zero cost of price comparison and un-
der heightened price competition. Some examples are car rentals, hotels, trains or more
generally any market where firms offer similar products or services and compete exclu-
sively on prices based on different reservation costs, a set-up corresponding to a reverse
English auction. To present this new approach in a tractable manner, we focus thereafter
on symmetric duopoly markets, i.e., markets with two companies that share a similar cost
structure and similar product characteristics such as frequencies.
We apply our methodology to revisit the literature studying airline alliance effects on
prices, where we make three important contributions. First, we directly work with indi-
vidual prices while traditionally, the impact of alliances -or cooperative agreements more
generally- is estimated in terms of average prices, aggregated over passengers, per air-
line, per market and per period. Second, our approach allows for a more comprehensive
treatment of the price distribution by jointly modeling airfares’ mean and the variance.
Finally, we estimate the impact of alliances on the variability of ticket prices, which has
not been considered before, neither by the literature on airline cooperation, nor by the
literature on the effect of competition on airfare dispersion.
Alliances are partnership agreements between two or more competing firms. There exist
a wide range of such agreements in the different sectors of the economy, see for instance
the review by Kang and Sakai (2000) on international alliances; our work is focused on
airlines alliances. The latter allow the carriers to cooperate, while maintaining certain
boundaries and not constituting a merger. Most of the practices that alliance partners can
engage in are considered beneficial for consumers: Alliance partners can market their
partners’ tickets and collaborate in supplying a product (codeshare), offering a larger
network reach (foreign carriers usually cannot operate within the domestic market known
as cabotage); they can coordinate their schedules, improving the service; and they can
share frequent flyer programs and promotional campaigns. The alliance may lead to lower
costs due to economies of density, because partners share airport equipment and staff.
4 For a recent survey, see Gentry et al (2018).
5 Y ield or revenue management is a variable pricing strategy that allows firms to increase revenues in
an environment with fixed capacity that has an expiration date (for instance, the takeoff of a plane) and
uncertain demand.
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Despite the listed benefits, the impact of alliances over consumers in terms of prices
is still open to discussion. There is general agreement that airline alliances can reduce
prices for international services, as suggested by Park (1997), Brueckner and Whalen
(2000) or Brueckner (2001). Most of the proposed products on international air markets,
namely, the connecting flights, combine the services of at least two carriers. For instance,
to travel from city A in one country to city C in another country, a stop is required in
city B, with the routes AB and BC operated by two different carriers. To the benefit of
passengers, their alliance can eliminate the double marginalization problem that appears
when each of the carriers prices its service independently from the other. Now, on markets
where partners in an alliance offer the same service, that is, on the so-called overlapping
markets, the double marginalization problem does not exist and airfares may be higher
because of the alliance if there are not enough competitors. As overlapping international
markets represent a small percentage of the total number of markets, the social costs of
higher prices are in this case largely compensated by the social benefits due to the removal
of double marginalization on connecting flights. That is why international alliances are
generally approved.
The situation used to be different for U.S. domestic alliances, where carriers are free
to provide service between any two cities and their networks can overlap significantly.6
The competitive effects of alliances in such markets caused concerns for the relevant
authorities, one example being the Continental/Northwest/Delta alliance in 2002. The
U.S. Department of Transportation (the DOT) argued that the process of communicating
the necessary information to organize the codesharing service would facilitate carriers to
collude explicitly or tacitly on prices and/or service in the overlapping markets. Despite
these allegations, the Department of Justice allowed the formation of domestic alliances
that eventually transformed into mergers, while their impact on airfares in the overlapping
domestic markets was still uncertain.7
To reassess such decisions, we implement our methodology on the US domestic direct
and connecting duopoly markets operated by legacy carriers during the third quarter of
2008. The service offered and the alliance status of the airlines define four market types.
We label markets as direct when both airlines operate direct flights. Similarly, for con-
necting markets, both airlines must operate connecting flights, that is, flights connecting
airport A to airport C with a stop by airport B. Moreover, markets can be classified as
alliance or non-alliance markets. If the two airlines operating in a market belong to the
6 The number of available slots and their allocation is regulated by the Department of Transportation at
only a few airports due to traffic congestion.
7 We discuss the relevant empirical literature in the next section.
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same alliance, we denote it as an alliance market. These are the overlapping markets of
the alliance partners. The market is non-alliance if the two airlines do not belong to the
same alliance.
We show that, in the considered duopoly markets, airline alliances are associated with
lower fares and higher price dispersion, the latter being measured by the standard devia-
tion of the price distribution and the associated coefficient of variation. Prices are lower
in alliance markets compared to non-alliance markets; more precisely, prices are 21 per-
cent lower in direct markets and 4 percent lower in connecting markets. This finding
suggests that alliance agreements lead to efficiency gains that are passed on to consumers.
Now, price dispersion is higher in alliance markets compared to non-alliance markets:
It is 13 (9) percent larger in direct (respectively, connecting) markets. The higher price
dispersion in alliance markets is potentially a consequence of more efficient price dis-
crimination techniques as allied airlines may share consumer’s information or coordinate
in other ways.
It is not clear if the combination of the two obtained effects is welfare improving. A re-
duction of the price mean is considered as welfare enhancing for a given quality level.
However, the effects of price dispersion depend on the dispersion source. Since the work
by Stigler (1961), there is a general agreement that price dispersion created by consumer
search costs is welfare decreasing. However, the origin of price dispersion can also be
price discrimination.8 A policy paper by Geradin and Petit (2005) argues that price dis-
crimination is an important and complex competition concern that should be considered
on a case-by-case basis. There is a large variety of price discriminatory practices, which
makes it arduous to classify them. A priori, their effect on total or consumer welfare is
not clear since it depends on factors such as the market size, the demand shape, the firm’s
cost structure or the offered quality.9 Here, thanks to our methodology, we point out that
the competitive analysis of alliances, in particular by competition authorities, should not
only focus on the effect of cooperation on the mean of the airfare distribution but should
also consider the impact on its variance.
Given that this methodology is general, it can be applied to analyze the competition is-
sues of alliances and cooperation in other industries when only price data are available.
8 There exist other potential sources of price dispersion such as demand uncertainty, costly capacity or
peak load pricing. See, for instance, Gale and Holmes (1993), Deneckere, Marvel, and Peck (1996) or
Dana (1999), who show that price dispersion can arise as a result of other factors and not be linked to
price discrimination.
9 We direct the reader to Geradin and Petit (2005) or to Armstrong (2008) for a thorough discussion on the
price discrimination theory and its effect on total and consumer welfare.
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As shown by Kang and Sakai (2000), alliances have been widely implemented in the past.
According to KPMG (2017), they are a valuable strategic opportunity for firms: “As crit-
ical drivers of growth, strategic alliances should be up there with M&A as a top priority
for CEOs.” Some examples from the car industry over the last 20 years are the Gen-
eral Motors-Fiat partnership, and the more recent Fiat-Renault and Daimler-Uber part-
nerships. (See KPMG, 2017.) In competition analysis, it is often the case that data on
quantities are not available and a structural estimation using prices and quantities cannot
be implemented. For instance, it is relatively easy to observe gasoline prices, but not
quantities, at gas stations. Thus, our methodology can be a relevant tool to analyze the
impact of a cooperation agreements between firms when only price data is available.
In the next section, we present the background to our work: our novel approach using
the standard industry data set, and the literature on airline alliances and price dispersion.
In Section 3.3, we introduce our theoretical model and the econometric specification.
Section 3.4 presents the data set and variables, and Section 3.5 provides the empirical
results. Lastly, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
In Subsection 3.2.1, we present the standard industry data set, the DB1B survey. We
discuss how our proposed model of ticket sales allows a more comprehensive analysis
compared to how the data has been used traditionally. In Subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we
respectively discuss literatures on the effect of alliances on average prices and the effect of
competition on price dispersion, as our methodology allows us to investigate both features
of the price distribution simultaneously.
3.2.1 The DB1B dataset
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) publishes a comprehensive price data
source, the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B). This survey is a 10 percent
sample of all airline tickets sold in the U.S. domestic market. It provides information on
the price paid for each ticket sold (called below the transaction price) for a given market
(or city pair) and for given product characteristics. The product characteristics are the
attributes that distinguish different types of flights within the same market, namely, the
operating airline, whether the flight is direct or connecting, and so on. Note that informa-
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tion about the purchasing date and the flight characteristics, such as the scheduled flight
date and time, are not available. Due to this limitation, other databases aside from the
DB1B, are sometimes considered in the airline literature.
Web data-scraping is one way to collect data on posted prices that includes the flight
characteristics as well as the date and time at which prices were posted. The structural
approach applied to data collected from online sources has great research potential for
airline dynamic pricing. See, for instance, Escobari (2012), Lazarev (2013) and Williams
(2013). The main limitation of this approach is that only posted prices are observed, but
not the transaction prices and the number of transactions. Moreover, structural models
using this kind of data are so far limited to the monopoly case because of the high com-
plexity of modeling competition in a dynamic framework. The collection of online data
may be blocked, as experienced by McAfee and Te Velde (2006) with American Airlines.
Computer reservation systems (CRS), such as Amadeus or Sabre, can provide information
on actual transactions, not only on posted prices, including information on the purchasing
date. However, only transactions that occur within the system are registered in this dataset.
Information from some airlines may be missing in certain markets, with no clear way to
model or reconstruct the missing data. The CRS data is usually sold at high prices to
airlines and not generally accessible to researchers. As far as we know, the only exception
is the work done by Sengupta and Wiggins (2012, 2014), Hernandez and Wiggins (2014)
and Escobari and Hernandez (2015), who had access to one CRS for most of the carriers
and domestic routes within US.
For these reasons, the DB1B remains the main source for analyzing different market and
product features of the U.S. domestic industry, such as competition, mergers, collusion,
entry of low-cost carriers (LCC), hub premium, or loyalty programs, as in Borenstein and
Rose (1991), Brueckner and Spiller (1991), Miller (2010), Brueckner, Lee and Singer
(2013), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1996), and Ciliberto and Williams (2010), respec-
tively. These studies use the average market price or average product price as the depen-
dent variable.
Traditionally, the airline literature studies average prices and price dispersion separately,
while our study is the first to propose a joint analysis of the mean price and the price
variability through a methodological contribution that allows us to work with individual
transaction prices from the DB1B.
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3.2.2 U.S. domestic alliances
The literature on domestic airline alliances exclusively uses the DB1B data set, and the
outcome variable is the average (at the market or product level) transaction price. The
alliance impact is typically measured by comparing the average prices before and after
the alliance formation. Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004) focus their analysis on
the Continental/America West and Northwest/Alaska alliances; Armantier and Richard
(2006) estimate the effect of the Continental/Northwest alliance; Gayle (2007) studies the
formation of the Continental/Northwest/Delta alliance. While Bamberger, Carlton and
Neumann’s (2004) results suggest lower prices for alliance markets, the last two studies
find the opposite result. All three studies find an increase in traffic volumes. The authors
interpret their results as suggesting that alliance partners are successful at expanding their
customer base and employing price discrimination strategies. They conclude that, while
the airline alliance can lead to higher overall prices, the outcome is not necessarily collu-
sive or universally welfare reducing for consumers.
To evaluate the overall effect of alliances on consumer surplus, Armantier and Richard
(2008) propose a structural discrete choice model, which uses individual transaction prices
as well as an auxiliary data set to circumvent the limitations of the DB1B. Their analysis
demonstrates that, while consumers using direct flights do face higher prices, this is com-
pensated by the overall improvement of service quality as a result of the alliance. This
methodology is not as easily accessible as what we propose below, because it requires
detailed data to supplement the DB1B.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the type of cooperation between alliance part-
ners as a product feature. Ito and Lee (2007) distinguish between virtual codeshared prod-
ucts (where one partner operates the flight and the other sells the tickets on that flight) and
traditional codeshared products (where both partners are involved in the operation of the
flight and both can sell tickets). They report that 85 percent of their sample are virtual
codeshare products and they are in direct competition with the airline’s own product in 70
percent of the markets. They conclude that alliance products are seen as inferior by con-
sumers in comparison to pure online flights (that is, flights operated and marketed by the
same airline) and used by airlines to price discriminate between consumers with different
willingness to pay. Gayle (2007) performs a similar exercise, but he focuses on the effect
of the presence of traditional and virtual codeshare flights on the average market price; he
finds that markets with traditional codesharing products have lower average prices, while
markets with virtual codesharing have higher average prices.
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While the literature attests that alliances (and more generally cooperation) are a relevant
factor influencing prices, the estimated effects on average prices vary according to the em-
ployed methodology and the selected data subset. The model that we present in the next
section updates this evidence regarding a more recent period in the history of alliances,
while complementing the analysis of price means with that of price dispersion.
3.2.3 Price dispersion in the airline industry
A large branch of the literature on airline markets has analyzed price dispersion and how
it is affected by different market features. As an outcome variable, these studies use ag-
gregated measures of price dispersion and the majority focus on the effect of competition.
Up to our knowledge, no study in this literature analyzes the impact of alliances or other
cooperation forms. Alderighi (2010) compiles the main results in this literature, where the
Gini index and the coefficient of variation are the most common measures of dispersion.
In a seminal paper, Borenstein and Rose (1994) regress the Gini coefficient on factors
related to costs. They exploit the difference in the number of carriers across markets
to measure the effect of competition on price dispersion, and they find a positive effect.
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) pursue the same objective by implementing a before-after
approach that uses fixed market effects to control for unobservable time invariant market
characteristics. They find the opposite result – a negative effect of competition on price
dispersion. Dai, Liu and Serfes (2013) find that the relationship between competition
and price dispersion may be non-monotonic. Despite the methodological differences, the
three studies used the DB1B database. Gaggero and Piga (2011) and Siegert and Ulbricht
(2014) use web-scraping to collect posted price data for the European market. They find a
negative correlation between competition and posted price dispersion, although the latter
shows that this correlation is positive when price dispersion is measured at the market
level rather than the flight level.
There is no clear consensus on the effect of competition on the variability of prices, or
what measure of dispersion is most suitable. Bachis and Piga (2011), Mantin and Koo
(2009) and Hernandez and Wiggins (2014) find that price dispersion decreases with the
level of competition using other types of price dispersion measures. Gillen and Mantin
(2009) and Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) find that competition does not generally af-
fect price dispersion. Recently Chandra and Lederman (2018) find that the relationship
depends on consumer heterogeneity and can be U-shaped.
We find it to be an important omission that none of the aforementioned studies analyze the
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impact of cooperation on price dispersion, despite the alliance and codesharing literature
demonstrating that cooperation certainly has a significant effect on price means. Our study
includes both competition and cooperation measures, and establishes a link between the
literature on price dispersion and that on alliances.
3.3 A model of airline competition
In this section, we detail the assumptions that allow us to establish the observational
equivalence of competition in the airline market with an auction model. We discuss the
underlying determinants of costs; we outline the derivation of the maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE); we describe how to estimate the distribution of prices and how coop-
eration, alliances in particular, affect it.
3.3.1 Overview
We propose a competitive framework aimed to depict appropriately the current economic
environment faced by airlines. The recent trends in the industry, specifically service ho-
mogenization and high consumer price sensitivity, motivate our assumption that, in the
short run, firms compete in prices given existing capacities.10
Assumption 1. The observed transaction price (airfare) is the result of price competition
between airlines.
We conjecture that legacy airlines propose similar quality levels and compete by setting
prices. Consider two airlines with different minimum prices at which they are willing to
provide the service, what we call their reservation cost. The latter comprises the operat-
ing cost as well as the opportunity cost of the service. First, the operating cost covers the
explicit costs to provide the service on a market.11 This cost can vary within or across mar-
kets when we observe flights with different numbers of connections, flights with different
distances or airlines with different economies of scale and scope. Second, the opportunity
10 We leave aside entry and exit issues, which are studied by Berry (1992). However, we control for the
potential bias that this could represent by sensitivity checks that include origin and destination level fixed
effects.
11 Operating costs are defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization to include aircraft or direct
operating costs such as fuel, aircraft servicing costs such as handling, traffic service costs such as meals
or flight attendance, booking and sales costs and other costs such as advertising or general administrative
expenses.
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cost is the value an airline places on selling a ticket now, relative to an uncertain sale
of a ticket with a potentially higher price closer to the departure date. The opportunity
cost varies over time within a market because it is affected by the purchasing patterns on
that market, which in turn depends on the remaining capacity on a flight, the number of
substitute flights and the expectation of future demand. Implicitly, the opportunity cost
incorporates the ability of an airline to price discriminate over the course of ticket sales
up to the flight takeoff.
The airline with the lower reservation cost has a competitive advantage – it can provide the
service at a lower price than its competitor. The profit-maximizing strategy of this airline
is to offer a price that is not unnecessarily low; it ”wins” the sale at the highest price that
guarantees a sale. In other words, the most competitive airline makes a sale by offering a
price that slightly undercuts the reservation cost of its competitor.12 Under Assumption
1 each ticket sale is viewed as a reverse English auction following the approach proposed
by Klemperer (2004) for internet sales.13
The reservation cost of any airline, at any point in time, can be split into two parts with
respect to its statistical nature and its relevance for the airlines. In the language of statis-
tics, there is a deterministic component that is common and observed by all competitors.
For example, the fuel cost to cover the distance between the ends of a market. There is
also a random component that is private knowledge and has private relevance to the cost
of an airline, for example, the idiosyncratic variation in the cost of fuel of each airline.
This is why we consider that:
Assumption 2. The random component of reservation costs is an independent private
value.
Furthermore, we treat the individual ticket sales as realizations of repeated, independent
auction games between symmetric players.
12 Our model is in line with the widely-spread yield management method of bid price control. In practice,
there are several techniques that the airline can use to increase their revenue, some of which involve
the estimation of a marginal cost of each seat on a plane, at each moment in time. One such method is
bid price control, where this marginal cost is used as a bid – an optimum cut-off required to accept a
booking. These bids correspond to reservation cost in our model, below which airlines are unwilling to
sell tickets. Bid prices are dynamically adjusted over time to reflect the changing reservation cost under
dynamic demand. This practice has been analyzed in the operations management literature by Talluri
and Van Ryzin (1998) and Adelman (2007), among others.
13 In a reverse auction, the auctioneer is a buyer and the participants are sellers who compete by offering
prices (their bids) at which they are willing to provide the service. During an open auction of this kind,
known as an English auction, competitors can observe each other’s bids (just as they do in our price
competition set-up) and react to them.
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Assumption 3. Ticket sales are realizations of independent, repeated auction games
between symmetric airlines.
Under Assumption 2 and 3, the private random component of each airline in each sale
is drawn anew from a probability distribution that is independent and identical across air-
lines and across sales.14 This allows us to specify a methodology based on the Paarsch
(1997)’s approach for estimating auction outcomes as we will explain in the next sub-
section. Our last assumption allows us to model price variability within a market using
market characteristics. The DB1B prices exhibit significant variability driven by the un-
available flight characteristics and purchasing date, and the literature has treated this issue
by averaging prices at the market level. We conjecture that flight characteristics and pur-
chasing dynamics are endogenous to the market fundamentals. Unlike previous work, we
propose to model this variability by making the following assumption:
Assumption 4. Market characteristics are determining factors of flight characteristics
and advance purchasing dynamics, and thus, of price variability within a market.
For example, in a large metropolitan market we would expect multiple flights with dif-
ferent characteristics due to the large and diverse population; as a result, price variability
would be higher because different flights have different operating costs. Higher or more
diverse population income would affect the advance purchasing patterns. For instance,
more last-minute business travels would cause the opportunity costs to vary more signifi-
cantly. Thus, the market features, in terms of income and size, determine the unobserved
flight features and the advance purchasing patterns over time. This rationale allows us to
model the variability of airfares as a function of the market features.
3.3.2 The model
In this section, we pattern the equilibrium bidding strategy in a reverse English auction
under the independent private values paradigm. We identify the players and describe each
player’s own information, available strategies and rewards; finally, we characterize the
equilibrium. We consider exclusively duopolies for the sake of simplicity.15
14 As auctions are repeated among players with capacity constraints, an ideal model should account for this
dynamic; however, the DB1B dataset does not provide any information on the acquisition date which
impedes analyzing such dynamics.
15 Scenarios with more than two players imply asymmetry of the players, as usually only two of them will
be in an alliance. Asymmetry would add significant complexity to the analysis without broadening the
contribution of our methodology.
78
Suppose that a single buyer (namely, the consumer or the traveler) wishes to purchase one
ticket in a market with two players (that is, the sellers or the airlines). Each player has a
reservation cost to provide the ticket, which we denote c. The strategies available to the
sellers are their bids (announced, posted or offered price) as a function of the reservation
cost. The game proceeds as follows. The consumer only cares about prices and compares
the airlines’ offers.16 The players fully observe, and can react to, each other’s prices.
Whenever it is profitable for them to do so, they can undercut the price of the competitor
to win the sale. Each player is willing to lower one’s price up to p = c, but not lower.
The winner is the player with the lowest reservation cost who undercuts slightly the op-
ponent with the highest reservation cost. The resulting transaction price corresponds to
the highest reservation cost among the two players.
To estimate this model, we implement the MLE methodology for auction data proposed
by Paarsch (1997). Given the equilibrium of the game, the observed transaction price is
a function of the reservation cost: It is the highest reservation cost from two indepen-
dent and identical reservation cost draws. Let us assume that the reservation cost has a
cumulative distribution F and a respective density f in R. Moreover, we assume that the
reservation cost follows a logarithmic normal distribution with mean and standard devia-
tion , its natural logarithm being a normally distributed variable.17
Denoting by o (d) an airport at origin (destination, respectively), a market is defined as
a directional city pair od.18 The likelihood of an observation i in the market od is the
occurrence probability that an airline sells ticket i at a price piod for a travel from o to d.
For clarity of the exposition, the exact derivation of the likelihood, which is standard, is
left for the Appendix. The likelihood of a single price observation is written as:
Liod = 2F (piod|µiod, σiod)f(piod|µiod, σiod) (3.1)
The MLE approach yields estimates for the distribution parameters (µod, and σod) such
that the resulting price distribution approximates the observed sample of individual ob-
16 For example, consumers may use one of many and very popular websites offering search and compar-
ison services, such as Kayak, Expedia, Orbitz and Travelocity, that allow consumers to enter their trip
parameters and obtain a price ranking.
17 The advantage of the logarithmic-normal distribution is that it allows us to interpret the coefficients
of all the continuous explanatory variables as elasticities, as the explanatory variables themselves are
transformed by taking their natural logarithm.
18 The directional definition provides the basis for the delineation of relevant market in many studies. See
Gayle (2007) and Berry and Jia (2010) or Luttmann (2018).
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servations as close as possible.
The task is now to estimate the parametric effect of variables of interest (notably the
presence of alliances) on the distribution of reservation costs. Through the distributional
relationship between the reservation cost and the transaction price, we derive how these
variables ultimately affect the transaction price distribution. To do so, we discuss in the
next subsection how the distribution parameters are identified and estimated.
Model Specification
Let Xod be a vector of N variables relevant to the market od. These market factors affect







where α and β are the N -parameter vectors of the underlying reservation cost distribution
to be estimated.19
Our main interest is how these market factors affect the actual transaction prices. As
already discussed, the observed transaction price has a distribution that is a function of
the underlying reservation cost, that is, the highest out of two reservation cost draws. Let
us denote the corresponding mean and standard deviation of the price distribution as mod
and sod, respectively. Then, following the derivation in Nadarajah and Kotz (2008), we
can express the parameters of the price distribution in terms of those of the reservation
cost distribution.20 The mean of the transaction price, mod, is a combination of µod,
and σod, the mean and standard deviation of the reservation cost distribution. The price
standard deviation, sod, is simply the scaled standard deviation of the reservation cost.
The marginal effects of the set of variables Xod on mod and sod, denoted below as a and
19 The reservation cost comprises the operating cost as well as the opportunity cost of the service. We are
not able to disentangle the impact of operating and opportunity cost over α and β due to data limita-
tions. Modeling it would require information on the purchasing date and ticket characteristics of each
transaction, which is not available in the DB1B.
20 The exact forms of the different moments of the distribution of order statistics have been known for a
while and are available in many good reference books such as David and Nagaraja (2003).
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b, respectively, can then be simply calculated using the marginal effects α and β of the
reservation cost distribution as:



























Looking at Equation 3.4, we can infer that the average transaction price is larger than the
average reservation cost. However, we cannot conclude if the impact of the nth variable in
Xod will be larger over transaction prices than over reservation costs. The ranking depends
on the signs and relative magnitude of αn and βn coefficients. If they have the same sign,
then the impact on the mean price, an, is larger than the impact on the reservation cost.
If they have different signs, the overall effect depends on their relative magnitude and
significance. It may be the case that both αn and βn are significant but of opposite sign,
and an is insignificant.
21
According to Equation 3.5, the variables Xod have a smaller impact on the price standard





The distribution of prices presents a lower standard deviation because observed prices are
reservation costs that are selected in a “directional” way – we take the highest from two.
3.4 Data and explanatory variables
We use the DB1B data for the third quarter of 2008, and we select all markets satisfying
three conditions. First, we exclusively consider duopolies where only two airlines operate.
With more than two airlines, Assumption 3 of symmetry is violated, as one of the airlines
will not be part of the alliance, and this would complexify the exposition and methodology
without a significant benefit. Second, all the proposed flights must be direct flights or all
the proposed flights must be connecting, and we denote respectively the markets as direct
and connecting. Again, this is because our methodology requires that the airlines propose
21 Coefficients in vectors b and β share the same statistical significance. The significance of coefficients
in vector a is calculated by representing them as a combination of two randomly distributed normal
variables (α and β).
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equivalent products and compete exclusively on prices as indicated in Assumption 1.22
Furthermore, our analysis concerns only markets where major legacy carriers operate.
We do not consider LCCs and markets where they operate. The cost structure of LCCs
is different from that of legacy carriers, and moreover, they do not enter alliances, which
makes them an unsuitable group to use for comparison.23 American (AA), Alaska (AS),
Continental (CO), Delta (DL), Midwest (YX), Northwest (NW), United (UA), and US
Air (US) are the airlines that operate in our sample.24 The presence of each airline in each
market type according to the selected sample is found in Table 3.1.25
Table 3.1: Legacy carriers by market type: number of markets and observations
Direct Connecting Total
Carrier Markets Obs. Markets Obs. Markets Obs.
American 32 1,283 531 5,648 563 6,931
Alaska 2 116 51 829 53 945
Continental 1 38 257 2,637 258 2,675
Delta 12 708 623 5,746 635 6,454
Northwest 8 642 664 7,230 672 7,872
United Airlines 31 1,362 577 5,092 608 6,454
US Airways 8 303 539 6,870 547 7,173
Midwest 2 117 12 89 14 206
Total 48 4,569 1,627 34,141 1,675 38,710
Note:Number of markets and observations for the airlines in our sample. Each observation represents
a ticket sale. Since markets are duopolies, the total number of markets is the sum of all markets where
each airline operates, divided by two.
Explanatory variables
Our explanatory variables Xod include market, origin and destination characteristics and
are obtained from the DB1B and the U.S. Census Bureau. These variables affect the
operating and/or opportunity costs in a non-random manner. The complete list of variables
and their definition is displayed in Table 3.2. Distance is a market-level variable that is
22 This implies that we exclude duopoly markets where one airline offers connecting flights to attain d
while the competitor proposes direct flights. Direct flights are perceived by customers as higher quality
products than connecting flights.
23 Regional-legacy carrier agreements are not considered to be alliances but rather an integrated service.
As is standard in the literature, we recode tickets sold by regional carriers as the legacy partner.
24 The legacy carrier definition here is the same as in Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013).
25 Additional information on the cleaning process of the data set is presented in the Appendix.
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measured in number of miles between the origin and destination cities. The distance
between two cities impacts the level of operating costs, as longer distances require more
fuel to reach the destination. Distance can also affect the opportunity cost of a ticket, as
it affects substitution with land travel.
Our demographic measures – Population and Income – are measured at the origin and
destination cities. Higher income cities have both richer leisure travelers who do not
need to plan in advance and more business travelers who book tickets in the last days
before departure. We therefore expect high income to lead to a higher average and a
lower variability for the reservation cost. Population, on the other hand, is a measure of
market size and could be associated with lower operating costs, as larger scale operations
are more efficient. However, the effect of population over the reservation cost is not clear
since a larger population can also imply higher opportunity costs, as more buyers are
expected to arrive closer to the departure date.
Table 3.2: List of variables and their definitions.
Variable Description
Distance The distance between the two city end-points of the market measured in miles.
Origin population The origin city’s population.
Destination population The destination city’s population.
Origin income The origin city’s income (GDP) in US dollars.
Destination income The destination city’s income (GDP) in US dollars.
Market volume Number of tickets sold on the directional market.
Origin volume Number of tickets sold for any market originating at the origin.
Destination volume Number of tickets sold for any market originating at the destination.
Origin markets Number of markets accessible from the origin.
Destination markets Number of markets accessible from the destination.
Origin hub Dummy equal to 1 if the origin city is a Hub.
Destination hub Dummy equal to 1 if the destination city is a Hub.
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Alliance Dummy equal to 1 if the two carriers operating on the market are in an alliance.
The Market volume variable is a measure of capacity or scale on the market; it is the
total number of ticket sales observed in that market. A higher volume is a combination
of higher number of flights and/or larger plane size, which would allow the airlines to
have lower average operating costs. At the same time, each additional flight is a substitute
for the other flights the airline offers, and a larger number of flights may lead to lower
opportunity cost variability.
We construct four other variables that describe the market in relation to the network. Ori-
gin volume and Destination volume measure the total number of ticket sales at the origin
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and destination of the market, respectively, to passengers traveling to any point in the
network. This is an alternative “scale” measure to Market volume. To quantify the mar-
ket’s centrality in the network, we build two variables: Origin markets and Destination
markets. Origin markets counts the number of cities directly accessible from the origin,
while Destination markets counts the number of cities from which one can fly to the des-
tination. The centrality in a network affects operating costs through scope economies and
the alternative use of resources (planes, personnel) in adjacent markets.
As a further measure of the importance of the origin and destination in the network of
the operating carrier, we include the dummy variables Origin hub and Destination hub.
The large scale of operations at hub airports may reduce operating costs, but costs may
also fluctuate more as the airline allocates aircraft capacity among connecting passengers
from different origins and destinations.
We also include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of the relative size of
the market share of the two carriers that relates to the level of competition between them.
Finally, we use a dummy variable to indicate the alliance presence, which we discuss in
more detail in the next subsection.
Alliance presence
In our definition of an alliance, we follow Ito and Lee (2007). Carriers are alliance part-
ners if passengers on one of the alliance carriers can earn elite-qualifying frequent flyer
miles on flights marketed or operated by the other alliance partner and vice versa. The
alliance presence is defined at the market level. The market can either be an alliance mar-
ket (Allianceod = 1) if both carriers are in the same alliance, or a non-alliance market
(Allianceod = 0) if the carriers are not in an alliance together. In this sense, we do not
model explicitly the exact type of cooperation products or level of coordination (flight
scheduling, sharing equipment and personnel, revenue sharing or else) that occurs within
alliance markets. The complete list of alliances by type of market, the number of markets
where they operate and the number of observations in the third quarter 2008 is provided
in Table 3.3.
The literature on the impact of airline alliances has approached the estimation of their
effect in two ways. Ito and Lee (2007) look at the prices of different types of alliance
products within the same market. Gayle (2007) and Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann
(2004), on the other hand, look at the effect of introducing an alliance product in a given
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Table 3.3: Presence of alliances in each market type.
Direct Connecting





Delta/Northwest 4 529 74 1,249
Northwest/Midwest 2 346 12 247
US Airways/United Airlines 2 70 67 1,338
Total alliance 8 945 215 4,111
Non-alliance 40 3,624 1,412 30,030
Note: Type and number of markets and observations for each alliance pair.
market. In our methodology, we compare prices across markets (cross-sectionally), rather
than before and after the agreement, to estimate how the presence of the agreement af-
fects them. The cross-sectional comparison allows us to focus on more recent and relevant
time periods compared to a before/after comparison, which must analyze data around the
time of the alliance formation. The model is estimated separately for direct and connect-
ing markets. As these markets have different demand and cost factors, we expect their
reservation costs to come from different distributions.
Ex-ante, it is not obvious how the alliance presence could affect the level and variability of
the reservation cost, as there are several potential effects working in opposite directions.
On the one hand, alliances are allowed to share certain operating costs such as personnel
and airport facilities, which could reduce operating costs. On the other hand, the ability
to coordinate schedules and to sell tickets on a competitor’s flights can make price dis-
crimination more profitable, affecting the opportunity cost and how it evolves over time.
The Alliance variable thus measures the overall effect of the alliance on the reservation
cost’s mean and standard deviation.
An important assumption in our approach is that, after controlling for all observed vari-
ables, alliance markets must be comparable to non-alliance markets. In other words, there
are no unobservable factors that make the alliance more profitable in the specific mar-
kets where the alliance operates. If this were not true, the estimated alliance effect would
also contain the effect of the unobserved factors, hence it would be biased. To avoid this
problem, Brueckner (2003) uses a model with entry. Another more direct approach that
is used by Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and Ito and Lee (2007) is to introduce fixed
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effects, which we consider in Subsection 3.5.2.
Summary statistics
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics for direct and connecting markets distinguishing
between alliance and non-alliance markets. As expected, the distance in direct markets is
much shorter compared to that in connecting markets. Still, note that transaction prices in
these two types of markets are on average very similar. The summary statistics indicate
that, the direct and connecting markets appear to be quite different in their characteristics,
and therefore, we expect that the effect of these characteristics on prices to be different.
Overall, there do not seem to be significant differences in market characteristics between
alliance and non-alliance direct or connecting markets. The only exception is that non-
alliance markets have larger populations and higher traffic volumes in both the direct and
connecting markets. Although the variables are presented here in levels, for the estimation
they are transformed by taking their natural logarithm.26 This transformation allows us to
interpret the coefficients of all continuous variables as elasticities. In other words, each
estimated coefficient represents the percentage change in the mean µod or the standard
deviation σod of the reservation cost given one percent change in the relevant variable.
The Alliance coefficient, however, is a dummy, and its interpretation is slightly different;
we multiply the estimated coefficient by 100 to obtain the percentage change of the mean
or standard deviation of the reservation cost when Alliance = 1. This interpretation is
also relevant for the price mean and standard deviation, mod and sod, respectively. The
effects of the explanatory variables on mod and sod are derived using equations (3.4) and
(3.5).
3.5 Empirical results
In Subsection 3.5.1, we present the estimation results from equations (3.2)− (3.5) using
the full set of covariates measuring the market characteristics. Our main results are pre-
sented in Subsection 3.5.2, where we control for unobserved factors not included among
our explanatory variables by re-estimating our model with fixed effects. These results
indicate that omitted variable bias is a valid concern and that fixed effect estimation is
preferred. Finally, in Subsection 3.5.3 we present the results for the coefficient of varia-
26 This is common in the airline literature. See, for example, Ito and Lee (2007).
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Table 3.4: Average values by market type and alliance presence.
Direct Connecting
Alliance Non-Alliance Alliance Non-Alliance
Price (USD) 607 514 558 524
Distance (Miles) 863 828 2,585 2,366
Origin population 2,064,981 4,787,705 1,431,042 2,297,882
Destination population 2,291,229 3,952,544 1,419,460 2,183,883
Origin income (USD) 59,721 56,373 53,693 53,307
Destination income (USD) 60,444 55,851 55,011 53,978
Market volume 189 141 28 34
Origin volume 7,385,647 17,100,000 3,542,906 6,036,518
Destination volume 7,998,992 14,100,000 4,700,607 5,987,512
Origin markets 95 86 26 31
Destination markets 98 73 27 32
Origin hub 1 0.75 0.21 0.25
Destination hub 1 0.62 0.25 0.26
HHI 0.57 0.58 0.63 0.67
tion.
Estimation with market covariates
Table 3.5 contains the results from the estimation of equations (3.2) and (3.3) on two
separate sub-samples, direct and connecting markets.27 First, the Alliance variable has no
significant effect on the mean reservation cost in direct markets, and it has a positive effect
of 1.2 percent in connecting markets. Second, there is a significant and positive effect of
5.4 percent on the standard deviation in direct markets and 2.1 percent in connecting
markets.
The effects of other covariates are less consistent between market types, and we believe
this is due to the different underlying market characteristics and demand. For instance,
distance has a positive impact on the mean of the reservation costs for both direct and
connecting markets, which is due to the cost of fuel and other operating expenses. At the
same time, higher distance is associated with more varied reservation costs in direct mar-
kets but less varied reservation costs in connecting markets. This finding can be explained
considering the option to substitute air travel with land travel in direct markets: Reserva-
27 A likelihood ratio test indicates that the jointly estimated model is strongly rejected in favor of the
separate estimations.
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tion costs are lower for early tourist demand that is sensitive to surface transportation
competition and higher for last minute business demand for which surface travel is not an
attractive substitute. Substitution with land travel is less feasible in connecting markets. It
is likely that longer connecting trips are done predominantly by tourists and planned much
in advance, hence on average there is less last-minute demand, and reservation costs are
more stable.
Table 3.6 presents the effects of the market factors on the transaction price, calculated
using equations (3.4) and (3.5). As previously noted, the estimated parameters of the
standard deviation of the distribution of transaction prices are always lower compared
to those of the distribution of the reservation costs. Intuitively, the transaction price has
less variability because the competition between the carriers leads to the highest reserva-
tion cost being the transaction price. The mean coefficients, however, are a combination
of both the mean and standard deviation coefficients of the distribution of the reserva-
tion costs, and thus, the overall effect depends on their respective significance, signs and
relative magnitude. The resulting effect of Alliance on the mean of the distribution of
transaction prices is still not significant in direct markets and it has a positive 2.4 percent
effect in connecting markets. The effect on the standard deviation is 4.4 percent in direct
markets and 1.8 percent in connecting markets. We observe a negative and significant
effect of competition, as measured by HHI, on transaction price dispersion in connecting
markets. These results are in line with the results obtained by Gerardi and Shapiro (2009),
who find that price dispersion decreases with competition.
Estimation with fixed effects
In this subsection, we propose to control for unobserved factors that may correlate with
Alliance and could bias its effect by re-estimating our model with origin and destination
fixed effects. However, in direct markets the Alliance variable is collinear with some
fixed effects and cannot be separately identified. This is due to the small number of
direct markets. We solve this issue by including origin fixed effects only and keeping the
covariates measured at the destination level. We do not have the same issue in connecting
markets, and we include both origin and destination fixed effects in that estimation. The
estimated effects of the Alliance variable on the reservation cost and the transaction price
are reported in Table 3.7.
The results indicate that omitted variable bias is a valid concern. Alliance now has a
significant and negative effect on the mean of the reservation cost distribution in both
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Table 3.5: Reservation cost distribution: mean and standard deviation
Direct Connecting
µod σod µod σod
Alliance -0.011 0.054*** 0.012** 0.021***
(0.022) (0.013) (0.005) (0.003)
HHI -0.130** 0.028 -0.071*** 0.040***
(0.054) (0.033) (0.009) (0.005)
Distance 0.172*** 0.038* 0.278*** -0.029***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.004) (0.002)
Origin population 0.073*** -0.01 -0.007* -0.006*
(0.013) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Dest. Population 0.092*** 0.0 -0.067*** -0.009***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Origin income 0.499*** -0.099 -0.043*** -0.016*
(0.114) (0.065) (0.012) (0.007)
Destination income 0.240* -0.160* 0.069*** -0.002
(0.104) (0.056) (0.012) (0.007)
Market volume 0.107*** -0.023* -0.056*** -0.008***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Origin volume -0.166*** 0.013 0.023*** -0.007***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Destination volume -0.175*** -0.007 0.032*** 0.007***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Origin markets 0.335*** 0.036* 0.011* 0.024***
(0.030) (0.018) (0.004) (0.003)
Destination markets 0.386*** 0.056* 0.023*** -0.010***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.004) (0.003)
Origin hub -0.100* -0.095* 0.001 0.013***
(0.051) (0.030) (0.006) (0.004)
Destination hub -0.240*** -0.073* 0.064*** 0.011*
(0.049) (0.027) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant -3.933* 2.976* 3.872*** 0.961***
(1.724) (0.946) (0.194) (0.114)
Likelihood -9,166 -9,166 -47,503
Number of observations 4,569 4,569 34,141
Note: Standard error are given in parentheses. The symbols */**/*** indicate statistical
significance at the 5/1/0.1 % level, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Transaction price distribution: mean and standard deviation
Direct Connecting
mod sod mod sod
Alliance 0.02 0.044*** 0.024*** 0.018***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003)
HHI -0.114* 0.023 -0.049* 0.033***
(0.052) (0.027) (0.009) (0.004)
Distance 0.193*** 0.031* 0.261*** -0.024***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
Origin population 0.068*** -0.009 -0.060*** -0.006***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Dest. population 0.092*** 0.0 -0.010*** -0.005*
(0.013) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Origin income 0.443*** -0.082 -0.072*** -0.007***
(0.099) (0.054) (0.003) (0.001)
Destination income 0.15 -0.132* -0.052*** -0.013*
(0.101) (0.046) (0.011) (0.006)
Market volume 0.094*** -0.019* 0.068*** -0.002
(0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
Origin volume -0.159*** 0.01 0.019*** -0.006***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Destination volume -0.179*** -0.006 0.036*** 0.006***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Origin markets 0.355*** 0.030* 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.029) (0.015) (0.004) (0.002)
Destination markets 0.417*** 0.046* 0.018*** -0.008***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.004) (0.002)
Origin hub -0.154*** -0.078* 0.008 0.011***
(0.044) (0.024) (0.006) (0.003)
Destination hub -0.281*** -0.060* 0.070*** 0.009*
(0.045) (0.022) (0.006) (0.003)
Constant -2.254 2.457*** 4.414*** 0.793***
(1.561) (0.781) (0.185) (0.094)
Note: Standard error are given in parentheses. The symbols */**/*** indicate statistical
significance at the 5/1/0.1 % level, respectively.
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direct (-24.3 percent) and connecting markets (-5.9 percent). The effect of Alliance on
the standard deviation of the reservation cost is augmented to a positive 5.2 percent in
direct markets and a positive 2.8 percent in connecting markets. The resulting effect
on the mean of the transaction price distribution is negative and significant as follows:
-21.4 percent in direct markets and -4.3 percent in connecting markets. The effect on
the standard deviation of the transaction price distribution is positive and significant as
follows: 4.3 percent in direct markets and 2.7 percent in connecting markets. Overall, our
results indicate that alliances are associated with lower transaction prices and higher price
dispersion in both direct and connecting markets, and the effect in direct markets is much
stronger.
To ensure the airlines’ symmetry assumption, we perform a sensitivity analysis on a re-
stricted sample of symmetric markets, where the market share and flight frequencies are
almost equal for both airlines. The negative and significant effects over price means in
both direct and connecting markets remains (-16 percent and -4 percent, respectively,
reported in Table 3.7). There is no significant effect over the standard deviation in con-
necting markets, but there is a positive effect of 6.9 percent in direct markets.
Table 3.7: The effect of Alliance in different specifications.
Fixed Reservation Transaction
effects cost price
Market Sample Origin Dest. µod σod mod sod
Direct Full Yes No -0.243*** 0.052* -0.214*** 0.043*
(0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.017)
Connecting Full Yes Yes -0.059*** 0.028*** -0.043*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Direct Sym. Yes No -0.207*** 0.084* -0.160*** 0.069***
(0.049) (0.027) (0.046) (0.022)
Connecting Sym. Yes Yes -0.041* 0.002 -0.040* 0.002
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008)
Note: Standard error are given in in parentheses; Origin and Destination fixed effects are controlled for, but
estimates have been suppressed in the table. Direct markets include covariates measured at the destination level.
The symbols */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 5/1/0.1 % level, respectively.
Coefficient of variation
As argued in the introduction, the coefficient of variation (CV ) is a standard metric for
price dispersion in the literature. To be consistent with previous work, we present here
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the effect of Alliance on the CV of prices. The reservation cost and transaction price
are transformed by the natural logarithm in our estimation; then, we construct the CV
of transaction prices using properties of moment generating functions. The complete
derivation of the CV is presented in the Appendix. Note that, in the end, the CV of prices














Since Alliance is an indicator rather than a continuous variable, its marginal effect is
obtained as the difference between the CV when Alliance is one and zero, that is to say:
∆CV (Alliance) = CV (Alliance = 1)− CV (Alliance = 0)
For testing the significance of the alliance effect, we use the estimated standard deviation
of the log-reservation cost evaluated at either Alliance = 1 and Alliance = 0 and at the
sample mean values for all other covariates.
Table 3.8 contains the estimated CV s for direct and connecting markets, both for the
model with covariates and the model with fixed effects. In direct markets, Alliance is
associated with an increase in CV of 0.05, or approximately 13 percent, regardless of
whether the model is estimated with or without the fixed effects. In connecting markets,
Alliance is associated with an increase of the CV of 0.02, or approximately 7 percent, in
the model with covariates, and 0.025, or approximately 9 percent, in the model with fixed
effects.
As in the previous section, we perform a sensitivity check on our restricted sample of
symmetric markets. Table 3.8 presents the impact over the coefficient of variation, which
is positive and significant with an increase in CV of 0.083 (approximately 21 percent)
for direct markets and no effect on the connecting markets. This result is particularly
relevant. The literature has not found a clear relationship between competition (usually
measured with HHI) and price dispersion. In the restricted sample, we should not observe
price dispersion differences due to competition since all the markets have two competitors
with similar HHI levels. However, there is higher price dispersion for direct markets with
28 In the formula, exp(.) indicates the exponential function and Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution of the
standard normal function.
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Table 3.8: The effect of Alliance on the coefficient of variation of transaction prices.
Model with covariates
Sample CV (Alliance = 1) CV (Alliance = 0) ∆CV (Alliance)
Direct markets Full 0.457 0.404 0.053***
Connecting markets Full 0.315 0.295 0.020*
Direct markets Symm. 0.447 0.394 0.083***
Connecting markets Symm. 0.292 0.287 0.005
Model with fixed effects
Sample CV (Alliance = 1) CV (Alliance = 0) ∆CV (Alliance)
Direct markets Full 0.445 0.393 0.052***
Connecting markets Full 0.295 0.27 0.025*
Direct markets Symmetric 0.472 0.389 0.083***
Connecting markets Symmetric 0.262 0.26 0.002
Note: Standard error are given in in parentheses; Origin and Destination fixed effects are controlled for, but estimates
have been suppressed in the table. Direct markets include covariates measured at the destination level. The symbols
*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 5/1/0.1 % level, respectively.
an alliance, even after we control for all possible market effects. This result shows that
cooperation among airlines affects price dispersion, which should not be omitted when
analyzing the relationship between competition and price dispersion. In this sense our
work is a new step contributing to the work by Liu and Serfes (2006) and Chandra and
Lederman (2018) that tries to reconcile the conflicting results in the earlier literature.
3.6 Conclusion
Airline markets have gone through many transformative changes in the last couple of
decades. Low-cost carriers expanded their services and made standard the “no frills”
type of service, decreasing the importance of service quality and increasing the homog-
enization of the product. The spread of the Internet as a sales channel has been another
challenge for the industry; consumers’ search and comparison costs became negligible
using online travel agents and price comparison sites. Furthermore, the recent economic
crisis made all travelers, and particularly business travelers, very sensitive toward prices.
We are motivated by these recent changes in the industry to propose to represent the ticket
sales process by means of an auction model. This approach, which is the main novelty of
this paper, is applicable to any online sales process based on prices.
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We apply this model to revisit the analysis of airline alliances, a form of cooperation in
airline markets that has caused much controversy. Our novel approach allows us to work
with the individual data observations of the DB1B and to simultaneously explore the ef-
fect of alliances on price means and price variability, the latter being completely novel
to the alliance literature. Our results indicate that alliances are associated with lower
prices and higher price variability in both direct and connecting markets. These results
are in contrast to previous results in the alliance literature by Gayle (2008) and Armantier
and Richard (2006), which were relevant to the post-alliance formation period of the late
1990s and early 2000s. This difference in results could be well explained by the emerging
competition from LCCs and by the fact that alliance partners were responding by passing
their efficiency gains down to the consumers. Additionally, the higher standard deviation
of prices suggests alliance partners have improved their price discrimination strategies.
Although we are not able to distinguish whether the alliance effect is due to a synchro-
nization of operating costs or a better management of opportunity costs, our analysis is a
valuable stepping-stone in the direction of understanding the effect of cooperation agree-
ments.
Our results shed a new light on the debate of the impact of competition on price dispersion.
Indeed, the literature studying this issue presented in Subsection 3.2.2 has not found a
clear conclusion. For the first time, our analysis shows that markets with similar levels
of competition present higher dispersion levels due to the presence of cooperation, in the
form of alliances. The proposed methodology could be applied to analyze the impact over
the price distribution of other cooperation forms. In the case of airlines, codesharing has
been a frequent issue of concern for competition authorities. Diverse types of alliance
or cooperation agreements are present in a wide range of industries, such as Financial
services, Pharmaceuticals, Automobile or Software.29
Beyond the question of the impact of alliances in airline markets, we hope that our ap-
proach based on the econometrics of auction models will be applied to facilitate the anal-
ysis of any issue of interest in markets where competition is based on prices, when only
price data are available and when the analyst is interested in both price levels and disper-
sion.
29 Kang and Sakai (2000) present a review of international strategic alliances between 1990 and 2000 by
sector and by country or region.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Order statistics and Maximum Likelihood derivation
To estimate a model using the maximum likelihood approach, we need to specify the dis-
tribution by which our data is generated. In the framework that we propose, the price is an
order statistic of the reservation cost; it is the highest reservation cost from two randomly
drawn reservation costs. Order statistics and their distribution are important elements of
auction models, where the winner is chosen based on a ranking of the bids, and the bids
are usually a monotonic function of the underlying random costs or valuations. For a
detailed exposition on the derivation of order statistics, see Paarsch and Hong (2006),
particularly Appendices 1 and 2 in their book. Here, we will explain intuitively how the
distributions are derived in our model.
Both carriers l and m offer the same service and draw their reservation costs, cl and cm,
from the same distribution F (c). A price observation takes the value p in two distinct
cases: in the case where player l makes the sale, and in the case where player m makes
the sale.
Let us take the last case, where player m makes the sale, which is an outcome of two
independent events happening simultaneously. Given the strategies of the players to lower
their offers/bids until it is no longer profitable, we know that the “loser”, carrier l, which
has the higher reservation cost, will have reservation cost cl = p exactly. At the same time,
the “winner”, carrier m, or the carrier with the lower reservation cost, must have cm <
cl = p. These are two independent events, and therefore, the probability of observing
price equal to p is the product of the probabilities of the two events:
P (p|m wins) = P (cm < cl)P (cl = p)
The probability of the first event is the sum of all probabilities for which cm < cl = p.
With a continuous distribution, this is the cumulative density F (p). The probability of the
second event is exactly the density of the distribution at p: f(p). Hence, we have:
P (p|m wins) = F (p)f(p)
Similarly, due to the symmetry of the players, the case of observing p when player l wins
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has the following probability:
P (p|l wins) = F (p)f(p)
Then, the unconditional event of observing the price p is the sum of the cases where l
wins and m wins:
P (p) = 2F (p)f(p)
3.8.2 Data cleaning
Regional “feeder” or “commuter” carriers are recoded as their major carrier partner. The
full table can be provided upon request. Carriers with less than 15 passengers are deleted,
since these probably reflect coding errors. We also remove tickets with prices lower than
50 USD and higher than 3000 USD. Most of these happen to be tickets at zero USD,
representing frequent flyer purchases. We also focus on markets with more than nine
passengers per quarter, as that is equivalent to one passenger per day given that the sample
represents 10 percent of the quarterly ticket sales.
Another modification of the data set comprises grouping airports in the same metropoli-
tan area.30 The six groups of airports are: Dallas-Fort Worth International and Love Field
in Dallas, TX; Baltimore/ Washington International, Dulles, and National in Washington,
DC; Midway and O’Hare in Chicago, IL; Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark in New York,
NY; Los Angeles, Burbank, and Long Beach in Los Angeles, CA; San Francisco, Oak-
land, and San Jose in San Francisco, CA. For example, Chicago Midway and Chicago
O’Hare International will represent the same market. Again, this is a standard treatment
in the literature (Berry and Jia (2010). Note this modification affects only approximately
15 percent of our observations, as we are working with duopoly markets that are usually
markets less central to the network.
Following Evan and Kessides (1993, 1994), we count carriers as operating in a given
market if their sales represent at least 1 percent of observations in the data, equivalently 1
percent of total sales.
30 Note than not all the metropolitan areas that are usually considered in the literature are included in our
database such as Miami or Houston.
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We study exclusively direct and connecting duopoly markets. In any market, we might
observe unusual choices by travelers using long paths (two or three connecting airports)
due to capacity constraints in the supply or to random events such as bad weather condi-
tions, technical issues on a plane or strikes. Therefore, we include in our database markets
where a third airline exist with a market share smaller than 5 percent or markets where
less than 5 percent of the passengers use alternative routes (for instance, flying with 3
coupons), although these passengers are excluded from our analysis.
3.8.3 Deriving the Coefficient of Variation
The coefficient of variation (CV ) is defined as the variable’s standard deviation divided
by the variable’s mean. In our case, we are interested on the transaction price p with















Our model analyzes the logarithm of the reservation costs in duopoly markets. We call
log(cl) and log(cm) the logarithms of the reservation costs of our two competitors, airlines
l and m, respectively. The logarithm of the transaction price is the highest of the two
reservation costs, log(p) = max(log(cl), log(cm)).
With the moment generating functions obtained from Nadarajah and Kotz (2008) for the
max/min of two random variables, we can compute:
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